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Abstract
While option-theoretic models are widely used in valuation of other fixed-income 
instruments, their applications for the valuation of mortgage-backed securities face 
challenges. Mortgages are explicitly written with a call option, which allows 
mortgagors to prepay their mortgages any time before the maturity. The magnitude 
and timing of exercising the prepayment options are not purely driven by economic 
factors, but also the mortgagor’s individual preferences and personal behaviours. This 
brings difficulties to valuing mortgage-backed securities with conventional models.
In this thesis we aim to explore the prepayment risk caused uncertainties in valuation 
of mortgage-backed securities. We start with empirically examining an 
option-theoretic model proposed by Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004). This model 
has special features to treat borrower heterogeneity and suboptimal exercises of the 
prepayment options. Based on the empirical results, we propose to employ linear 
prepayment functions to model borrower heterogeneity. The new MBS valuation 
model with the integration of linear prepayment functions is also tested with empirical 
data.
Our results suggest that mortgages with different coupon rates have different
refinancing tendencies even towards the same market rate change. Therefore,
assuming the same refinancing pattern to all classes of mortgages may lead to errors
in pricing mortgages and MBSs. For mortgages with coupon rate below the prevailing
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refinancing rate (as proxied by the 30 year libor rate) plus the refinancing cost, a 
prepayment function with a low initial prepayment rate and a high slope will model 
the prepayments best. On the other hand, for mortgages with coupon rate above the 
current refinancing rate plus the refinancing cost, a prepayment function with a high 
initial prepayment and a mild slope will perform best. Meanwhile, refinancing 
burnout is also an important factor in modelling mortgage prepayment. Our results 
suggest that when the underlying mortgages are seasoned mortgages, especially when 
the prepayment option has been deep-in-the-money for a long time, the low initial 
prepayment high slope function will model their prepayments the best. Once these 
different refinancing tendencies are factored in the modelling of mortgage prepayment, 
the accuracy of the MBS valuation model is greatly improved.
Chapter one: Introduction of Mortgage-Backed Security 
and the U.S. MBS Market
The mortgage-backed security (MBS) market in the United States has experienced 
fast growth during the past two decades. Mortgage-backed securities transform 
relatively illiquid, individual financial assets into liquid and tradable capital market 
instruments. The ability of securitizing mortgage loans enables mortgage originators 
to remove the assets from their balance sheet, help them to access a larger supply of 
capital, and also enable them to diversify their financing sources. By enhancing the 
liquidity of home mortgage loans and increasing the supply of funds for mortgage 
loans, the financial innovation of securitization has contributed to the development of 
the U.S. mortgage market. It also ultimately benefited the housing market in terms of 
promoting the homeownership. The homeownership rate in the United States in 1968 
was only 63.6%. It reached an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004 and remained at similar 
level until the burst of the subprime crisis in later 2007. The homeownership rate 
started to fall ever since and stood at 66.5% by the end of 2010. The homeownership 
rates in the United States from 1968 to 2010 are presented in Figure 1.1.
Despite the rapid growth of the MBS market, the valuation of mortgage-backed 
securities remains unsolved. The difficulty of pricing mortgage-backed securities lies 
in the complexity of estimating mortgage prepayments. Mortgagors in the United 
States have the option to prepay their mortgages anytime before the maturity, which
brings uncertainties of the future cash flows of mortgages and mortgage-backed 
securities. Existing prepayment models can be classified as econometric or 
option-theoretic models. The econometric modelling approach, also known as 
reduced-form models, is to build econometric prepayment models based on historical 
data. Econometric models are good at estimating what happened before but have 
difficulty in predicting the future since the economic environment continually changes. 
Option-theoretic models, also known as structural models, model mortgage 
prepayment as a call option. While option-based prepayment models have appealing 
theoretical features, they generally face two challenges: modelling the suboptimal 
prepayment behaviours and modelling borrower heterogeneity. It is widely recognized 
that mortgagors do not exercise their prepayment options optimally. Some mortgagors 
may delay the exercise of the in-the-money calls while others choose to exercise the 
out-of-the-money calls.
The main objective of this study is to explore the option-theoretic MBS valuation 
models and seek solutions to improve the MBS valuation model. We will primarily 
concentrate our investigation on agency pass-through MBSs backed by fixed-rate 
mortgages since they are the dominating component in the MBS market. We will 
focus our investigation on the prepayment risk caused uncertainties in MBS valuation 
and aim to answer the following questions:
A: how does mortgage prepayment affect the valuation of mortgage-backed 
securities?
B: are there any factors that have impact on the modeling of mortgage prepayment 
and consequently on the MBS valuation model but have been missing from the 
literature?
C: if there are, how to incorporate them into the modeling of mortgage prepayment so 
as to improve the MBS valuation model?
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) have proposed an option-theoretic MBS valuation 
model with special features to treat borrower heterogeneity and suboptimal 
prepayment behaviors. But whether these features can improve the accuracy of the 
MBS valuation model has not been rigorously tested. We start our exploration with 
empirically testing this model. The empirical investigation of the Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) model is reported in Chapter three, after a brief introduction of the 
U.S. MBS market in this chapter and the literature review in Chapter two. Chapter 
four then examines the parameters of the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) model in 
order to investigate how the model parameters affect the performance of this model. 
In Chapter five we propose to modify the MBS valuation model by employing a linear 
prepayment function to model borrower heterogeneity. The linear prepayment 
function models are also examined with empirical data. Chapter six concludes this 
thesis.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 provides an overview of the 
mortgage market in the United States. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the MBS
market in the United States. An introduction of the three governmental agencies is 
given in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 outlines the risks that are associated with 
mortgage-backed securities and how they impact on the valuation modelling. Section 
1.5 provides a brief description of the subprime mortgage crisis and how it impacts 
the MBS market. Section 1.6 concludes this chapter.
1.1 Overview of the Mortgage Market in the U.S.
A mortgage is a loan secured by the collateral of specified real estate property. 
Mortgages are originated by various financial institutions to home buyers to finance 
their purchases of real estate properties. Mortgage loans are made under varying terms 
(i.e. 10-year, 20-year or 30-year); during the life of the loan, the loan balance is 
generally amortized until it is paid off. The borrower usually repays the loan in 
monthly instalments which include both principal repayment and interest payment.
The mortgage industry has undergone massive evolution in recent decades. The size 
of mortgage debt has grown tremendously. The US mortgage debt outstanding in 
1999 was only $6.3 trillion. By the end of 2009, it increased to $14.3 trillion, more 
than doubled of 10 years ago. Figure 1.2 shows the expanding of the mortgage market 
from 1999 to the third quarter of 2010 in terms of mortgage debt outstanding.
Various types of mortgage products have also been created as a result of innovation to 
meet different borrowers’ needs. The rest of this section provides a brief overview of 
the types of mortgages and some terms that are used to distinguish mortgages.
By interest rate type: fixed rate loans vs. adjustable rate loans
By interest rate type mortgages can be issued as Fixed-Rate Mortgages (FRMs) or 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARMs). Fixed-rate mortgages have the mortgage rate set 
at the origination of the loan and the rate will remain constant in the term of the loan. 
The monthly payment of fixed-rate mortgage is constant over the life of the loan.
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) have note rates that are subject to changes over 
the life of the loan. The periodic contractual rate is based on specified reference rate 
plus a spread that are predetermined in the contract. Indices like the one-year 
Constant-Maturity Treasury (CMT) and the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
are popularly used as reference rates. ARMs typically adjust or reset annually, 
although instruments with one- or six-months resets are also available.
A recent innovation in the ARM area is the fixed-period or hybrid ARM. Hybrid ARM 
loan starts with fixed rates for a period of time, such as 3, 5, 7, and 10 years after the 
origination. At the end of the fixed-rate period, the loans switch to an adjustable-rate 
loan, i.e. the rates reset periodically in a fashion similar to traditional ARM loans.
By loan balance: conforming loans vs. nonconforming loans
Mortgages can be sold to government agencies or private institutions for
securitization. However, government agencies are restricted to purchasing or
guaranteeing mortgages with unpaid balances below a specific amount. This specific
maximum loan size is referred to as “conforming balance limit.” Mortgages with
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unpaid balances equal to or less than the conforming loan limit are referred to as 
conforming loans; mortgages which exceed the conforming loan limit are known as 
nonconforming loans.
The conforming loan limit is set by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO has the regulatory oversight to ensure that government 
agencies fulfill their charters and missions of supporting liquidity and stability in the 
secondary mortgage market and increasing the supply of affordable housing. OFHEO 
adjusts the conforming loan limit annually based on the October-to-October change in 
the average housing price in the Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) o f the Federal 
Housing Finance Board.
By creditworthiness: prime loans, jumbo loans, Alt-A loans, and subprime loans
In practice, lenders and securitization institutions have been relying on credit scores to 
assess borrowers’ creditworthiness. Several different credit models are available in 
practice, but these scores are sometimes generically referred to as “FICO scores”. 
Credit scores range from below 400 to over 800. The general rule of thumb is that 
borrowers with scores above 660 are usually considered as prime borrowers; 
borrowers with scores below 660 are usually considered as subprime borrowers 
(Fabozzi 2006). But sometimes, the distinction between prime and subprime 
borrowers is not as clear-cut as it might appear (Barth et a l 2008).
Conforming mortgages borrowed by prime borrowers with high credit scores and full 
documentation are prime loans. Mortgages with strong credit score and full 
documentation but greater than the size the conforming limit are called jumbo loans. 
Mortgage loans borrowed by borrowers with high credit score but unwilling or unable 
to provide full documentation are labelled as alt-A loans. Mortgage loans borrowed 
by mortgagors with weak credit scores, and no verification of income or assets are the 
so-called subprime loans.
1.2 Overview of the MBS Market in the U.S.
1.2.1 Introduction of MBSs and Their Derivatives
Mortgages may take years to pay off; lenders are keen to find ways to remove the 
assets off their balance sheets so that they could issue more loans. In order to do so, 
lenders sell groups of mortgages with similar characteristics to agencies or 
private-label institutions, who are responsible for issuing or guaranteeing 
mortgage-backed securities. The agencies or private-label institutions package loans 
that generally confirm to their standards, convert the pool of mortgages into a security, 
and sell the security to investors. This process is a process of securitization; the 
security created is called mortgage-backed security.
Mortgage-backed securities represent a direct ownership interest in a pool of
mortgage loans. The issuer or servicer of pass-through securities collects the monthly
payments from mortgage borrowers, and passes through the cash flows to MBS
investors in monthly payments. The resulting of the securitization carries a guarantee
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from the issuers or guarantors of MBS who will guarantee and pass through timely 
payment of principal and interest from mortgage repayment to MBS holder, even 
when the mortgage borrowers fail to make the payment. In return, the issuers or 
guarantors charge a servicing fee. The first pass-through mortgage-backed security 
was issued in 1970, with a guarantee by Ginnie Mae. Soon after, Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae began to issue pass-through mortgage-backed securities. The following 
diagram illustrates the entities that are involved in the process of MBS securitization 
and the capital flows between them.
buying MBSs juying mortgage
mortgage '  mortgage
cash flow ■Hi cash flow
originating loans
I
mortgage 
cash flow
A more creative development in the mortgage security market was the creation of 
MBS derivatives that derive from pass-through MBSs or mortgage portfolios. The 
most popular MBS derivatives are Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) and
Stripped MBS
Salomon Brothers and First Boston created the first CMO in 1983. The CMO is a 
multiclass bond backed by a pool of mortgage pass-throughs or mortgage loans. In 
structuring a CMO, cash flow of an underlying pool of mortgages or MBSs are
divided into several classes. Each class has a different claim on the mortgage
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collateral and is sold separately to different types of investors. The different classes 
making up a CMO are called tranches or bond classes.
Stripped MBS, first introduced in 1986, consists of two classes: principal-only (PO) 
class and interest-only (10) class. Principal-only (PO) class receives only the principal 
from the underlying mortgages; and interest-only (10) class receives just the interest.
1.2.2 The Fast Growth of the MBS Market in the U.S.
As a result of increasing market interest in mortgage-backed securities, especially
during the first few years of this century, the mortgage security market becomes one
of the largest financial markets in the world. The high volume of outstanding
mortgage securities, combined with the large number of investors, creates a sizable
and active secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. The mortgage security
market is by far the largest debt market in the United States in terms of both new
issuance and the outstanding volume, which was historically dominated by the
Treasury bonds. Table 1.1 shows the issuance volume in the United States bond
market by sectors from 1996 to 2010. The issuance volume of mortgage-related
securities exceeded Treasury Bonds in 1997. The mortgage security market has been
expanding aggressively between 1998 and 2007. In most of the years during that
period the issuance volume of mortgage-related securities was double of the
Treasuries, sometimes even as high as four times. But the situation changed a little bit
after the subprime crisis. The expanding of the mortgage security market started to
slow down since 2008. In contrast, the issuance of the Treasuries began to surge,
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which is believed to be due to the Quantitative Easing plan from the government to 
rescue the market. As a result, in both 2009 and 2010 the issuance volume of the 
Treasuries was higher than mortgage-related securities.
The outstanding volume of mortgage securities also overtook the U.S. Treasuries 
since 1999, as shown in Table 1.2. Despite the slowing down of the new issuance in 
the mortgage security market and the upsurge of the issuing of the Treasuries in the 
last two to three years, the mortgage-related security market is still by far the largest 
debt market in the United States in terms of outstanding volume. By the third quarter 
of 2010 the market value of the outstanding mortgage securities was approximately 
$8.9 trillion while the total outstanding of U.S. Treasury was $8.5 trillion.
1.3 Overview of the US Governmental Agencies
In the United States mortgage-backed securities can be issued or guaranteed by either 
government agencies or private-label institutions. In general, governmental agencies 
issue mortgage-backed securities backed by conforming loans. Private label 
institutions guarantee nonconforming loans. Government agencies include the 
Government National Mortgage Association (also known as Ginnie Mae, or GNMA), 
the Federal National Mortgage Associate (also known as Fannie Mae, or FNMA), and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (also known as Freddie Mac, or 
FHLMC). The latter two are often referred as Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs).
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The issuance of mortgage-backed securities is primarily dominated by government 
agencies. The issuance volume of mortgage securities by government agencies and 
private institutions (or non-agency institutions) from 1996 to 2010 are listed in Table 
1.3. Historically, government agencies far exceeded private institutions in terms of 
mortgage securities issuance. However, the issuance of non-agency mortgage-backed 
securities started to accelerate since 2003. It reached its peak in 2006 with the 
issuance volume of $917.2 billion. The issuance of agency MBS in the same year was 
$1.2 trillion. However, the private-label MBS market was severely hit by the 
subprime crisis and declined sharply since 2008. The private-label issuance in 2010 
shrunk to $13.5 billion, even much lower than its level in 1996. On the other hand, the 
issuance of agency MBSs remained stable. The issuance volume of agency MBSs in 
2010 was $1.7 trillion.
1.3.1 Government National Mortgage Association
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) is a division of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It was created by the United
States Federal Government through a partition of the Federal National Mortgage
Association in 1968. Ginnie Mae aims to provide guarantee to the MBSs backed by
federally insured or guaranteed loans, such as loans insured or guaranteed by the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
Rural Housing Service (RHS), and Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH). Ginnie
Mae guarantees the MBS investors of full and timely payments, no matter mortgage
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payments are collected or not. Ginnie Mae securities carry the full faith and credit 
guaranty of the United States government.
Ginnie Mae’s major pass-through products include: Ginnie Mae I and Ginnie Mae II. 
Ginnie Mae I requires all mortgages in one pool to be the same type (e.g. 
single-family). Each mortgage must be, and must remain, insured or guaranteed by 
FHA, VA, RHS or PIH. In addition, the mortgage interest rates must all be the same 
and the mortgages must be issued by the same issuer. The servicing fee of Ginnie Mae 
I is usually 50 basis points. The minimum pool size is $1 million; payments on Ginnie 
Mae I MBS are made on the 15th of each month, or the first business day after that if 
the 15^  ^of a month is not a business day.
Ginnie Mae II allows multiple-issuer pools to be assembled, which in turn allows for 
larger and more geographically dispersed pools as well as the securitization of smaller 
portfolios. A wide range of coupons is permitted in a Ginnie Mae II MBS pool, and 
issuers are permitted to take greater servicing fees -ranging from 25 to 75 basis 
points. The minimum pool size is $250,000 for multi-lender pools and $1 million for 
single-lender pools. Ginnie Mae II MBS has an additional five-day payment delay; 
payment is made on the 20th day of each month, or the first business day after that if 
the 20^  ^of a month is not a business day.
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1.3.2 Federal National Mortgage Association
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is a government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) that was chartered by Congress in 1938. The mission of Fannie Mae 
is to support liquidity, stability and affordability in the secondary mortgage market. It 
is prohibited from originating loans and lending money directly to consumers in the 
primary mortgage market. Fannie Mae’s most significant activities include providing 
market liquidity by securitizing mortgage loans into Fannie Mae MBS, and 
purchasing mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities in the secondary market 
for their own mortgage portfolio \
As a federally sponsored agency, Fannie Mae receives no direct government funding 
or backing. Fannie Mae securities carry no government guarantee of being repaid. 
However, there is a wide perception that Fannie Mae MBSs carry an implied 
government guarantee. In general, securities issued by Fannie Mae are considered to 
be of high credit quality.
Fannie Mae buys either conventional, FHA or VA mortgages to create the pools 
backing mortgage securities and offers several types of pass-throughs. Compared with 
Ginnie Mae MBSs, mortgages pooled in Fannie Mae securities are more 
heterogeneous with mortgage rates; in some pools mortgage rates differ by as much as 
200 basis points from the portfolio’s average mortgage rate. Payments of Fannie Mae
1 Source: Fannie Mae 2010 Annual Report.
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MBSs are made on the 25* of each month, or the first business day after that if the 
25* of a month is not a business day.
1.3.3 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) is another 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) of the United States government. Freddie 
Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 to provide competition in the secondary 
mortgage market so as to end Fannie Mae’s monopoly.
Freddie Mac also guarantees timely payment of both principal and interest on its 
mortgage securities. Same as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac does not carry explicit 
government guarantee. However, securities issued by Freddie Mac are also considered 
of high credit quality. Payments of Freddie Mac MBSs are made on the 15* of each 
month, or the first business day after that if the 15* of a month is not a business day.
1.4 Risk Characteristics and Valuation of Mortgage-Backed 
Securities
As other fixed-income products, mortgage-backed securities are subject to interest 
rate risk and credit risk. But uniquely, mortgages and mortgage-related securities are 
also subject to prepayment risk.
1.4.1 Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk refers to the possibility of changes in the value of financial products 
caused by changes in interest rates. Interest rate contingent instruments can be valued
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through the term structure of interest rate models. Term structure models and their 
implications to fixed income instruments have undergone intensive exploration in the 
last few decades and a wide range of term structure models are available nowadays, 
such as Vasicek (1977), Cox Ingersoll and Ross (1985), Ho and Lee (1986) and Black 
Herman and Toy (1990). Skinner (2005) provides comprehensive descriptions and 
implementations of these models. But for the purpose of valuation of MBSs, any 
arbitrage-free term structure model can be used. Therefore, we will select one term 
structure model that is suitable to our modelling process. But interest rate risk 
modelling is not the main focus of this study.
1.4.2 Default Risk
Default risk refers to the possibility that a bond fails to pay coupons and principal in a
timely manner. We have to distinguish between the default risk of mortgages and the
default risk of MBSs. The default risk of mortgages refers to the risk that the
mortgage borrowers fail to repay their mortgage loans timely. The default risk of
MBS refers to the risk that the MBS guarantors/issuers fail to pass through the
mortgage payments to MBS investors. MBSs are guaranteed by either governmental
agencies or private-label corporations. Thus, these institutions are entitled to pay
MBS investors even if the mortgages default. Usually defaults of the underlying
mortgages trigger immediate payments of the outstanding principal from the
guarantors/issuers to MBS investors, leading to a prepayment of the MBS. But it does
not necessarily lead to a default of the MBS. Wallace (2005) stated when mortgage
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defaults were triggered for agency-insured MBS, such as Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae 
MBS, the principal recovery rates were 100%. From this perspective, default of the 
underlying mortgages is identical to prepayment or one source of the prepayment.
In fact, the market generally considers agency MBSs have neglectable credit risk. The
reasons are threefold. First of all, mortgages qualified to be included in agency-issued
mortgage-backed securities are either prime mortgages, which have good credit
history and low credit risk, or mortgages guaranteed by FHAWA, which carry the
governmental guaranty. Secondly, in the case that the mortgage borrowers default and
fail to pay the principal or interest, their properties remain as collateral. The lenders
have the right to sell the properties to cover their losses. Thirdly and more importantly,
agency mortgage-backed securities haVe extra protection from default risk. Mortgage
securities issued by Ginnie Mae carry the full faith and credit of the U.S. government;
mortgage securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered as carrying
implied government guarantee. Reiss (2007) argued that the federal govemmenf s
support to Fannie and Freddie is an actual “implied guarantee” that has been written
into the statutes and regulations governing Fannie, Freddie, and other financial
institutions. He developed a full list of privileges that Fannie and Freddie are granted
by their federal charters or from regulatory authorities, which clearly support the
existence of the implied guarantee. For example. Congress created Fannie and Freddie
to achieve a public purpose; Congress exempted Fannie and Freddie from many laws;
Congress treats Fannie and Freddie like extensions of the federal government; the
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Federal Reserve Board treats Fannie and Freddie securities like government securities; 
Fannie and Freddie’s securities are eligible for unlimited investment by federally 
regulated lenders; and Fannie and Freddie have weaker capital requirements than 
other financial institutions. The recent government takeover^ of both of them also 
demonstrated the existence of the implied government guarantee. Peterson (2009) 
stated that the federal guarantee to Fannie’s and Freddie’s bonds and 
mortgage-backed securities was now demonstrably present. In addition, Stein et al 
(2010) suggested that while the credit crisis had a major impact on the government 
agencies, their guarantees were still being priced as if they were sound.
In this thesis we, in line with other researchers, will treat the agency pass-through 
mortgage-backed securities as default-free securities. However, the default of 
underlying mortgages is considered as one source of the MBS prepayments.
1.4.3 Prepayment Risk
Residential mortgagors in the United State have the option to pay more than the 
required monthly payment or pay off the loan prior to the maturity. This is referred as 
prepayment. When prepayment happens, MBS issuers or guarantors are obliged to 
pass through any unscheduled payments of principal to MBS investors. The 
prepayment behaviour brings uncertainty of the future cash flow of the MBS. This 
uncertainty is referred as prepayment risk.
2 On September 6, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship due to their huge losses in investment 
in subprime mortgages. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) acts as the conservator.
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Mortgage prepayments can occur due to various reasons, such as sale of property, 
relocation, and more importantly the fall of interest rate. When the prevailing market 
rate is lower than the mortgage contract rate, borrowers have the incentive to prepay 
their existing mortgages and refinance their properties at a lower rate. The 
interest-rate-driven refinancing can be viewed as a call option. However, mortgagors 
often exercise their prepayment options suboptimally. For example, some mortgagors 
would rather delay the exercise of the in-the-money calls because they expect further 
decline of the market rates. In addition to the interest-rate-driven refinancing, 
mortgagors may also prepay their mortgages due to non-interest-rate reasons, such as 
job relocation. All these factors make it difficult to estimate mortgage prepayments. 
Modelling of mortgage prepayment is regarded as the most crucial and also the most 
difficult part of valuation of mortgage-backed securities. In this thesis our exploration 
of MBS valuation model will focus on the role of prepayment modelling. Our 
objective is to explore how mortgage prepayment modelling affects the valuation of 
MBS and how to improve the modelling of mortgage prepayment in order to improve 
the MBS valuation model as a whole.
Due to the prepayment and changes in the prepayment speed, mortgages and MBSs
have negative convexity. When prepayments increase as interest rates decline, the
average lives and durations of mortgages and MBSs will be shortened. Conversely,
when prepayment speeds are reduced, the average lives and durations of mortgages
and MBSs will be lengthened. This behaviour causes the price changes in mortgages
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and MBSs to be decidedly nonlinear in nature and to underperform those of assets that 
do not exhibit negatively convex behaviour.
1.5 The U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis
No doubt the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis is one of the landmark events in recent 
financial history. The subprime mortgage crisis started to emerge in 2005 - 2006, as 
characterized by a rise in subprime mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. The 
severe subprime mortgage crisis later triggered the global credit crisis and 
subsequently the crisis in the broader economy.
The subprime mortgage crisis began to affect the financial sector in February 2007, 
especially when HSBC wrote down its holdings of subprime-related MBS by $10.5 
billion, the first major subprime related loss to be reported. The fear of not knowing 
how much subprime-related debt your counterparty really holds caused panic in 
financial markets and led to massive credit seizing in 2008. The credit crisis in 2008 
brought a series of significant institutional failures. In March 2008, investment bank 
Bear Steams was hastily merged with JP Morgan with $30 billion in government 
guarantees. In early September of 2008 both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
nationalized by the US government as mortgage losses increased. In the same month 
investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankmptcy. The near-meltdown of the 
credit market shifted the crisis into a deep recession in the broader economy, which is 
still unrecovered at the time of the writing of this thesis.
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It is understood that the primary factor creating the subprime mortgage crisis was the 
boom and bust cycle in house prices. In the boom phase, rising prices motivated 
lenders and investors to put ever more money into the mortgage sectors, not only 
through prime mortgagors but also risky mortgagors. Brueckner, Calem and 
Nakamura (2012) state that bubble conditions in the housing market spur subprime 
lending, with favourable price expectations easing the default concerns of lenders and 
thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers; In the meantime, 
the demand created by subprime lending feeds back onto house prices and helps to 
fuel an emerging housing bubble. These investment decisions underestimated the 
impact that falling house prices could have on subprime mortgage defaults. What 
further broadened the impact of the subprime crisis was the action of financial 
institutions using extremely high leverage and creating extreme maturity mismatches 
in their funding. When housing prices stopped appreciation in 2006, major global 
financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime-related debts 
reported significant losses. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased as 
the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy.
The subprime mortgage crisis has had a major negative impact on the private-label
MBS market because private-label MBSs are usually backed by subprime mortgages.
The private-label securitization of subprime mortgages almost ceased after the crisis
(Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2011). Table 1.3 has illustrated that new issuance of the
private-label MBSs has fallen sharply since 2008 and became a very small component
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of the MBS market. However, agency MBSs backed by prime mortgages remained 
robust. Their new issuance continued to grow. In this thesis our investigations will be 
carried out on agency MBSs. The debate of who to blame for the subprime mortgage 
crisis is still going on, but it does not affect the viability and implication of this study 
since agency MBSs market is still actively traded and keeps growing.
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we overviewed the mortgage market and the MBS market in the 
United States. We also looked at the three governmental agencies that issue and 
guarantee mortgage-backed securities. The risk characteristics of mortgage-backed 
securities are also discussed in this chapter. We also provide a brief description of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and how it impacts the MBS market. In next chapter we will 
review previous research that are related to mortgage prepayment modelling and the 
valuation of mortgage-backed securities.
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Figure 1.1 Homeownership Rates in the United States 1968-2010
This figure graphs the homeownership rates o f  the United States from 1968 to 2010. The Homeownership rate o f  the U.S. 
reaches its highest point in 2004 and remains at similar level between 2004 and 2007. However, it started to fall after the 
financial crisis.
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Figure 1.2 US Mortgage Debt Outstanding 1999-2010
This figure shows the growth o f  the U.S. mortgage market since 1999. The U.S. mortgage debt outstanding as o f the end o f 2009 
stands at $14.3 trillion, more than doubled o f 10 years ago in 1999 at the level o f $6.3 trillion.
Trillions
Source: Federal Reserve
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Table 1.3 The Issuance Volume of Mortgage Securities 1996-2010 (SBillions)
This table lists the issuance volume o f mortgage securities by both government agencies and private institutions. The non-agency 
MBSs market expanded quickly from 2003 and 2006. But it was severely hit by the financial crisis in 2008.
* In 2010, $21.3 billion FDIC and NCUA have been issued. FDIC transactions are structured transactions backed by assets o f  
failed banks and may include non-mortgage related collateral; NCUA transactions are structured transactions backed by assets o f  
failed credit unions and may include non-mortgage related collateral
Agency Non-Agency Total
1996 440.7 51.9 492.6
1997 535.0 69.4 604.4
1998 952.0 191.9 1,143.9
1999 884.9 140.5 1,025.4
2000 582.3 101.7 684.0
2001 1,454.8 218.8 1,673.6
2002 1,985.3 288.5 2,273.8
2003 2,725.8 440.6 3,166.4
2004 1,375.2 532.7 1,907.9
2005 1,321.0 901.2 2,222.2
2006 1,214.7 917.4 2,132.1
2007 1,372.2 773.9 2,146.1
2008 1,299.2 45.0 1,344.2
2009 1,925.0 31.9 1,956.9
2010 1,707.3 13.5 1742.1*
Data Source: the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
A substantial body of work is devoted to the valuation of mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities. The MBS valuation models range from econometric 
valuation methods to option-theoretical models and from assuming optimal call to 
recognizing suboptimal prepayment behaviour. The majority of previous work 
focuses on the prepayment risk of the underlying mortgages while others also 
incorporate the modeling of default risk. In this chapter, we will review previous 
research on MBS valuation modelling and take a look at what has been achieved in 
the past.
This chapter divides the literature of MBS valuation modelling into four phases by 
time. Section 2.1 introduces the early years of MBS valuation modelling after the first 
MBS was issued in 1970. Section 2.2 presents MBS valuation modelling in 1980s. 
Section 2.3 exhibits MBS valuation modelling in 1990s. MBS valuation modelling 
after 2000 is described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes and concludes this 
chapter.
2.1 Early Stage of MBS Valuation Modelling
During the early years after the first mortgage-backed security was introduced into the 
market in 1970, the practice has been employing the traditional average life method to 
price pass-through mortgage-backed securities. The traditional average life procedure 
attempts to incorporate mortgage prepayment by assuming that the mortgage will be
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repaid regularly according to the amortization schedule until a period equal to the 
average life of a comparable portfolio of mortgages, and at this point the remaining 
loan balance will be repaid in full. In practice, the average life was typically assumed 
to be 12 years.
The problem with this approach is initially addressed by Curley and Guttentag (1974). 
They criticize the average life approach for ignoring the possibilities of the 
prepayment either before or after the expected average life. They correct for this 
deficiency by incorporating the entire time distribution of prepayment probabilities. 
They also point out that prepayment rate depends on the age of the mortgages, the 
coupon rate and the current discount points. Linear regression and historical loan data 
are used to estimate the conditional probabilities of mortgage prepayments. Their 
work opened the way for modelling the dynamic nature of mortgage prepayment 
activities.
2.2 MBS Valuation Modelling in 1980s
Dunn and McConnell (1981b) first extend the interest-contingent valuation models 
into the pricing of GNMA mortgage-backed pass-through securities. In this paper, 
they develop a model for valuing GNMA mortgage-backed pass-through securities, 
which is based on the generic model for pricing interest contingent securities 
developed in Brennan and Schwartz (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1978). In 
their model, mortgage prepayment is treated as a call option issued by the mortgage 
holder. The generic interest contingent model assumes that the current risk-free
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interest rate completely summarizes all information relevant for the pricing of 
fixed-rate securities. The generic model also assumes that a borrower will prepay his 
loan according to the optimal call policy, i.e. the prepayment option will be exercised 
once the prevailing market rate becomes lower than the mortgage contract rate. The 
risk-free interest rate is assumed to follow the mean reverting stationary Markov 
process given by the stochastic differential equation
dr = n{i) dt +  a(r) dz, (2.1)
where
=  k{m- r), k,m>Q,
(j{r) = crVr , o-constant, and
dz\s a Wiener process with E{dz) = 0 and dz  ^— c/fwith probability 1. The function //(/) 
is the instantaneous drift of the process, kis  the speed of adjustment parameter, m is the 
steady-state mean of the process, and the function a^(r) is the instantaneous variance. 
Negative interest rates are precluded with this mean reverting interest rate process and 
the variance of the process increases with the interest rate.
In addition to the optimal call options, they also recognize that many mortgagors call
their loans even when the market interest rate is above the contract rate, which is
referred as suboptimal prepayments. Suboptimal prepayments are modelled to follow
A Poisson-driven process. The Poisson random variable, y, is equal to zero until the
loan is called suboptimally. If y jumps to one, there is a suboptimal prepayment and
the security ceases to exist. The Poisson process, dy, is given by
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_ (0  i f  a suboptimal prepayment does not occur 
^  ~ \ l i f  a suboptimal prepaymet occurs
Where
Fidy) = 2(r,r) dt
And is the probability per unit of time of a suboptimal prepayment at a 
time to maturity ran d  interest rate r.
With the added suboptimal prepayments, the value of a GNMA security V{r,r,y) is a 
function of two state variables, r andy, and is governed by the following process.
dV=[a{r,f) V- C(r) -  A(rr)(F[r) - I0]dt+ s(r,T) Vdz+ [F(r) -  V\dy (2.3)
In (2.3), T is the term to maturity, a{r,f) is the total instantaneous expected rate of 
return on the security and s{r,r) is the instantaneous standard deviation of the return, 
conditional on the Poisson event not occurring.
They then use the model to evaluate the impact of the MBS features on their price,
risk and expected return. They find that the amortization and suboptimal prepayment
features increase the price of a GNAM security while the callability feature decreases
it. In terms of the absolute magnitude, the callability feature has a greater impact on
the value of the security than either of the other two features when the remaining term
to maturity is long. However, the amortization feature has the largest impact on value
when the term to maturity is short. The effect of all three features is to reduce the
interest rate risk and, consequently, the expected return of GNMA security relative to
other securities which do not have these features. But this study does not examine
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whether the prices generated by their model are consistent with observed market 
prices.
Dunn and McConnell (1981a) conduct simulation and sensitivity analysis to compare 
prices generated by the contingent claims model with those generated by the average 
life procedure and by a variation of the Curley and Guttentage (1974) method. These 
three models take different approaches to incorporating mortgage prepayments. Their 
empirical work shows that the differences in prices produced by these three models 
are significant. However, their work does not distinguish whether the contingent 
claims model yield better predictions of market prices.
Dunn and Singleton (1983) conduct an empirical investigation on a discrete time, 
consumption-based MBS valuation model. They do not explicitly model the 
conditional probabilities of prepayments. The possibility of prepayments and the 
effect of callability are reflected in the joint distribution of security prices, outstanding 
balances, and unscheduled prepayments. In this paper they restrict their investigation 
to 8 percent, fixed-rate, single family, concurrent date GNMA securities. The 
empirical results suggest that the restrictions on the behaviour of returns on GNMA 
securities implied by the consumption-based model are generally consistent with the 
data. They also investigate whether the relative prices of GNMAs to U.S. Treasury 
bonds are consistent with the equilibrium model, because at that time there was a 
view existing in practice that GNMAs were not properly priced relative to
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Government bonds and other investment alternatives. Their empirical investigation 
finds no evidence of this view.
Green and Shoven (1986) pioneered the use of proportional hazard models in 
modelling mortgage prepayment. They employ a proportional hazard model to 
investigate the sensitivity of mortgage prepayments to prevailing interest rates, with a 
data set of 3,938 mortgages held by two large California Savings and Loan 
Associations. Their results indicate that the prepayment rate is highly correlated with 
the relation of the market rate to the mortgage contract market. Their analysis also 
indicates that the due-on-sale clauses significantly affect the value of mortgage 
portfolios. While the model is successful in estimating prepayment rates for new 
mortgages, the proportional hazard model assumes that past interest rate environment 
has no effect on present prepayment, which is not realistic. For mortgages that have 
experienced interest rate variations, this assumption becomes problematic and may 
lead to overestimation of prepayment rates.
Schwartz and Torous (1989) develop one of the first reduced-form mortgage-backed 
securities valuation models in which prepayment is modelled as a function of a set of 
non-model-based explanatory variables. The explanatory variables in their model 
include mortgage’s age, refinancing rate, transaction cost, the fraction of the pool 
outstanding and seasonality. Historical prepayment data and a proportional hazard 
model are used to estimate the model. Their examination shows that all these 
variables affect mortgage prepayments in their expected directions. In particular,
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prepayments increase when refinancing rates are lower than the mortgage contract 
rates. As the size of the pool decreases, the prepayment probability decreases as active 
mortgagors have already prepaid their mortgages and left lagged mortgagors in the 
pool. Furthermore, prepayments accelerate significantly when refinancing rates are 
sufficiently lower than mortgage contract rates. However, while the conditional 
probability of prepayment increases during the summer months, the variable of 
seasonality does not appear to be significant. The estimated probability of prepayment 
initially increases with the mortgage’s age, reaching a maximum at 6.265 years and 
diminishing thereafter with age.
This empirical prepayment function is then integrated into a two-factor MBS 
valuation framework. They compare mortgage values assuming that prepayments 
occur according to their estimated prepayment function with mortgage values 
assuming an optimal call policy and with mortgage values assuming that prepayments 
occur according to FHA experience and finally with mortgage values assuming no 
prepayment. The results show that for low long rates mortgage prices assuming that 
prepayments occur according to their estimated prepayment function are closer to 
corresponding mortgage prices assuming an optimal prepayment policy since at these 
refinancing rates most mortgagors will prepay. However, for high long rates mortgage 
prices produced by their estimated prepayment function are closer to both the 
mortgage prices allowing optimal prepayments and the nonprepayable mortgage 
prices since at these refinancing rates most mortgagors in fact do not prepay.
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Titman and Torous (1989) examine the effects of optimal default behaviour on the 
pricing of commercial mortgages. Commercial mortgages are different from 
residential mortgages because prepayments of commercial mortgages are effectively 
prohibited and default risk is the primary risk for valuing commercial mortgages. In 
this paper default activity is treated as an optimal put option in the contingent-claims 
approach. Their results suggest that commercial mortgage rates generated by a 
two-state-variable contingent-claims pricing model provide accurate estimates of 
commercial mortgage rates quoted by large insurance companies. The authors also 
suggest that the spread between mortgage rates and treasury bonds can be explained 
by this model.
2,3 MBS Valuation Modelling in 1990s
Previous research regarding mortgage valuation has been either concentrating on 
prepayment caused mortgage termination but ruling out the possibility of default, or 
considering default caused termination while ruling out the possibility of prepayment. 
Kau et al (1992), for the first time, incorporate both default risk and prepayment risk 
into their valuation model for fixed-rate residential mortgages. The term structure of 
interest rates is the source of prepayment risk and the value of the house is the source 
of default risk. Nonfinancial terminations, such as job relocation and divorce, are also 
included in their model and modelled as a Poisson process, following Dunn and 
McConnell (1981b). This paper finds that, given that prepayment has already been 
accounted for in mortgage valuation, the marginal contribution of default is small
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when house price volatilities and loan-to-value ratios are low; but could be as large as 
the total value of the prepayment if the loan-to-value ratios and house price volatilities 
are high.
Kang and Zenios (1992) develop a complete model for estimating prepayments of 
fixed-rate mortgage pools. This model deals with prepayment activity of generic pools 
of mortgages instead of individual mortgages. In this paper four factors are considered 
as the key determining factors of prepayment rates, namely refinancing incentive, 
seasonal variations, seasoning of the mortgage pool and burnout effect. Each of the 
factors is calibrated with historical data and modelled separately. The complete model 
is finally built by combining the four factors using the multiplicative relation. Their 
empirical observations show that individual components of the model fit the historical 
data very well. The overall model also has high explanatory power in estimating the 
prepayment activity of generic pools.
Schwartz and Torous (1992) investigate the interaction of prepayment and default 
decisions in the valuation of mortgage pass-through securities. They point out that 
although a mortgage pass-through security is guaranteed by a financial intermediary, 
defaults of the underlying mortgages affect the timing of the pass-through’s cash 
flows and therefore its value. This paper carefully characterizes mortgagors’ 
prepayment and default decisions and integrates them into a mortgage pass-through 
security valuation framework. Their results indicate that mortgage pass-through 
security values are sensitive to the value of the underlying mortgaged house. More
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specifically, if the value of the mortgaged house is sufficiently low, the value of the 
mortgage pass-through security may exceed the value of the underlying mortgage 
since the pass-through security is guaranteed. They suggest that one needs to value the 
underlying mortgaged house more accurately in order to value the mortgage 
pass-through security more precisely.
Chhikara and Hanson (1993) employ a continuous-time contingent claims valuation 
model to price Farmer Mac^ pass-through securities. This paper investigates three 
prepayment scenarios: no prepayment, optimal prepayment and suboptimal 
prepayment. Optimal prepayment is driven by the stochastic interest rate process and 
the call option on the mortgage loan will be exercised once the refinancing rate 
becomes lower than the mortgage rate. Suboptimal prepayment refers to prepayments 
triggered by reasons like default, bankruptcy and relocation. Suboptimal prepayment 
is modelled as a Poisson process. The empirical results show that prices of MBSs 
assuming suboptimal prepayment are higher than corresponding securities with 
optimal prepayments, and they increase as the expected rate of suboptimal 
prepayments increase. In most cases, the price under no prepayment assumption and 
the optimal prepayment assumption represent the upper and lower bound on the value 
of the mortgage-backed security. They suggest that the actual MBS price lies
3 The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, commonly known as Farmer Mac, is a federally charted and 
government-sponsored corporation with the mission to increase the availability o f  mortgage financing to farmers and ranchers by 
providing a secondary market for agricultural real estate and rural housing mortgage loans. It was created by Congress in 1987. 
Unlike Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae that guarantee residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), Farmer Mac 
guarantees agricultural mortgage-backed securities (AMBSs). Moreover, the market size o f  Farmer Mac AMBSs is much smaller 
compared to the three RMBS giants. Therefore, Farmer Mac MBSs usually are not included in the discussions about 
mortgage-backed securities.
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somewhere between these two values, depending on the pattern of mortgage 
prepayments.
Kau et al (1993) investigate the valuation model of adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs). They suggest that while the house priee has a direct effect on the default 
option, it also has an indirect effect on the prepayment option since the exercise of the 
default option will make the prepayment option valueless. Their investigation 
indicates that larger default values are associated with higher loan-to-value ratios, 
higher house priee volatilities, and lower house prices. They also provide a 
comparison between fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs). The results show that rising house price volatility tends to increase the 
frequency of termination, and both the value of FRMs and ARMs will fall. In the 
absence of prepayment, the value of default is greater with FRMs than with the 
corresponding ARMs, since large upward variations in the value of payments with an 
FRM induces large default payoffs. However, in the presence of prepayment, default 
for an ARM has more value than for a FRM. Prepayment is much greater for a FRM 
than an ARM. In addition they suggest that in order to model the “suboptimal” 
prepayment option researchers may also want to consider “suboptimal” default.
Archer and Ling (1993) point out that although recent MBS research started to shift 
away from optimal call valuation models to suboptimal call valuation models, existing 
models are only able to incorporate one type of suboptimal, i.e. either failing to 
exercise in-the-money calls or exercising out-of-the-money calls. They develop a
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model that incorporates both types of suboptimal prepayments while retaining the 
endogenous eall. In addition, they recognize heterogeneous borrower transaction costs 
by assuming a lognormal distribution of transaction costs. This enables the model to 
account for the varying prepayment lags associated with well-in-the-money calls and 
to account for the burnout phenomenon
This paper also includes an empirical test to investigate the relative effects of 
interest-rate driven and non-interest-rate driven prepayment on MBS prices. The 
empirical data sample is end-of-month closing prices from July 1987 through January 
of 1991. The results suggest that the potential influence of eall behaviour on mortgage 
security prices is large relative to the influence of non-interest-rate factors. Therefore, 
endogenous call behaviour should be the focus of mortgage pricing models. Their 
results also indicate high implied transaction costs. The term transaction costs refer to 
not only the direct financial transaction costs, but also the indirect transactions costs 
that might create resistance for the borrowers to prepay, such as lack of 
creditworthiness, lack of comfort with financial affairs, opportunity cost, etc.
Ronn, Rubinstein and Pan (1995) extract arbitrage-free prices of prepayment options 
by creating a synthetic, nonprepayable GNMA composed of Treasury securities. The 
priee difference between the synthetic GNMA and the observed GNMA is regarded as 
the empirical estimate of the prepayment option value. Linear programming 
techniques are employed to build the time series of replicating Treasury security 
portfolios. This approach assumes GNMA and Treasury markets are efficient and they
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are also independent of assumptions regarding interest rate processes and the 
homeowner’s prepayment behaviour. They regress the option prices on variables 
including interest rate, age, pool burnout, volatility of interest rate, introduction of 
ARMs & CMOs. The results show that the five regressors explain more than 90% of 
the prepayment option value. They also compare their estimated time value of the 
prepayment option with time value produced by Black-Scholes option pricing formula. 
The results show that their estimated time values are consistent with the 
Black-Scholes values.
Stanton (1995) extends previous rational prepayment models in several ways. In this 
paper interest-rate-driven refinancing is modeled as an optimal call option. The Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model is used to characterize nominal interest rate 
movements. However, the transaction costs that are associated with prepayment is 
taken into account when judging whether it is optimal to exercise the prepayment 
option. As stated by the author, the transaction cost not only includes the monetary 
costs but also the value of nonmonetary components, such as filling out forms and lost 
productivity, etc., which reflect the difficulty and inconvenience of the refinancing, all 
the costs are assumed to be proportional to the remaining principal balance. Thus, 
given the current interest rate and the transaction cost level of the mortgage holder, 
the optimal prepayment strategy is determined.
This paper also recognizes that prepayment behaviours of mortgagors within the same 
pool are different. To treat borrower heterogeneity, this paper assumes heterogeneity
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of transaction costs. The distribution of prepayment costs among mortgage holders is 
modelled as a beta distribution.
In addition to the interest-rate-driven refinancing, this paper also recognizes that 
mortgage holders may also prepay for exogenous reasons, such as divorce, job 
relocation, or sale of the house. The likelihood of exogenous prepayment is described 
by a hazard function X, The parameter X represents a baseline prepayment level, the 
expected prepayment level when no interest rate driven refinancing should occur.
Monthly prepayment rates for 1,156 pools are used to estimate mortgage prepayments. 
These mortgages are newly issued single family residential mortgages, with a coupon 
rate of 12.5 percent and an initial term of 30 years. The model-produced prepayment 
behaviour can match closely with the observed prepayment behaviour. Similar with 
Archer and Ling (1993), the empirical result also indicates that the estimated 
transaction costs are significantly higher than the explicit monetary refinancing costs.
Archer, Ling and McGill (1996) investigate the influence of household and property 
characteristics on the mortgage termination decision. This paper uses micro data to 
examine empirically the prepayment behaviour of 5,042 non-defaulting homeowners 
between 1985 and 1987. An estimate of current property value is also used to measure 
post-origination equity in order to more accurately capture the property-specific 
variation in house price appreciation. This study suggests that the termination 
behaviour of income- or collateral-constrained households differs markedly from 
unconstrained households. When the household is either collateral constrained or
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income constrained, or the option is likely to be out of the money, the influence of the 
option value upon prepayment behaviour is less by half. However, when the status of 
the option and the influence of potential household constraints are more appropriately 
recognized, these factors account for nearly all explanatory power otherwise 
attributable to household demographic characteristics. Household demographic 
characteristics, such as age of household head and family size, are only important to 
the extent that they can predict whether a household will be income or collateral 
constrained.
Boudoukh et a l (1997) employ multivariate density estimation (MDE) procedures to
estimate the functional relation between MBS prices and its fundamental economic
determinants, especially the interest rate. The MDE method is applied to GNMA
securities of various coupons over the period 1987-1994. The data are prices of
weekly TBA (to be announced) GNMAs with coupons ranging from 7.5% to 10.5%.
The results show that the level of interest rates and the slope of the term structure are
important factors in describing the effects of the prepayment option on MBS prices.
The interest rate level proxies for the moneyness of the option, the expected level of
prepayments, and the average life of the cash flows; the slope of the term structure
controls for the average rate at which these cash flows should be discounted. The
MDE methodology is also able to capture the negative convexity of MBS prices.
While the level and slope of the term structure explain most of the variation of MBS
prices, the analysis also reveals cross-sectional differences among GNMAs with
different coupons, especially with regard to their sensitivities to movements in the two
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interest rate factors. A thorough examination of additional interest rate and 
prepayment factors (e.g., seasoning and burnout) is conducted but fails to provide an 
explanation. The source of this variation leaves a puzzle for future research.
Skinner (1999) develop an arbitrage free methodology for modelling fixed and 
variable rate mortgages in a report which is committed to develop a methodology to 
determine whether a mortgage offer and its associated redemption fee are fair in the 
UK market. Redemption fees in the UK compensate the financial institution for a call 
option they implicitly sell to the fixed rate mortgage holder. The author suggests that 
the value of the implied call option should equal redemption fees plus a modest 
administrative fee for the redemption fee to be considered fair. In this paper mortgage 
prepayment is treated as an optimal American call option. The Black, Derman and 
Toy (1990) model is employed to generate the term structure of interest rate. This 
report ignores the possible effect of non-fmancial prepayments under the assumption 
that the financial institution waives most of the redemption charge in the event of a 
non-financial refinancing and charges only for the administrative cost of redemption.
Chen, Maris and Yang (1999) examine the biases of single-factor term structure 
models relative to a two-factor model in the valuation of MBS and fixed-income 
securities. The two single-factor models investigated are the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(CIR, 1985), representing the single-factor fixed parameter term structure model, and 
the Hull and White (1990), as a representative of the single-factor time-varying 
parameter model. The benchmark two-factor model is an extension of the CIR model.
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This paper assumes that the two-factor model represents the actual term structure of 
interest rate, and differences in the prices obtained from alternative term structure 
models are the result of pricing bias introduced by the term structure model.
They generate four yield curve shapes to test the single-factor models: flat, 
downward-sloping, upward-sloping, and humped. Their results indicate that when the 
yield curve is monotonie, the option values provided by both single-factor models are 
close to the “true” value indicated by the two-factor fixed parameter model, while the 
time-varying parameter model is more accurate; however, for the humped yield curve 
case, neither of the single-factor models provide option values that are close to the 
true value, despite the errors of the time-varying parameter model are still less than 
the fixed parameter model. Thus, they suggest that a multi-factor term structure model 
is a better choice to incorporate the embedded interest rate options when valuing 
mortgages.
2.4 MBS Valuation Modelling after 2000
Kariya and Kobayashi (2000) propose a model to describe the burnout phenomenon 
of refinancing prepayments. The model explains the burnout phenomenon by the 
heterogeneity of prepayment incentives of mortgagors. More specifically, mortgagors 
have different incentive thresholds of prepaying their mortgages with regard to the 
spread of the initial and current mortgage rates, and therefore prepay at different times. 
In this model the prepayment is described as the time till an individual mortgagor 
prepays. The heterogeneity is therefore treated as the differences of the incentive
45
thresholds of the exiting time in terms of the spread of the initial and current mortgage 
rates. They assume normal distribution of the distribution of different incentive 
thresholds since the knowledge of the distribution is not sufficient. Based on the 
modelling of the incentive thresholds, they also develop a theoretical framework of 
valuing MBSs using Monte Carlo simulation procedure.
Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) develop a competing reduced-form model of 
mortgage termination using loan-level data. They argue that default and prepayment 
options are interdependent. Thus, the estimate of the default option would not be 
accurate without simultaneously considering of the financial incentive for prepayment. 
They propose a unified model which consider the two hazards as dependent 
competing risks and estimate them jointly. A proportional hazard framework is 
adopted to analyze these competing risks. The model also accounts for the unobserved 
borrower heterogeneity by assuming three different types of borrowers: astute 
borrowers, passive borrowers, and somewhere in between.
The empirical results show that the financial value of the call option is strongly 
associated with the exercise of the prepayment option and the probability that the put 
option is in the money is strongly associated with the exercise of the default option. 
Meanwhile, the results also provide strong support for the interdependence between 
prepayment and default. They suggest that ignoring the interdependence between 
default and prepayment risks and estimating them separately may lead to serious 
errors in estimating the default risk. The results also indicate the existence of
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significant heterogeneity. Their work also suggests that mortgagors with high initial 
LTV loans are more likely to exercise both the prepayment and the default options. 
However, unemployment and divorce rates only have significant effects on the default 
option. Furthermore, prepayment and default behaviours vary across regions.
Hall (2000) discusses the impact of refinancing burnout on prepayment model 
estimation, and proposes a method to control the burnout in the modelling of 
mortgage prepayment. The phenomenon of burnout is a result of the unobserved 
heterogeneity in prepayment behaviour. This paper follows Deng, Quigley and Van 
Order (2000) and Stanton (1995) to treat the impact of unobserved variables as a 
random variable with a distribution across borrowers. But unlike the earlier papers, 
this paper allows a more general probability distribution and makes no assumption 
about the source or identity of the unobserved variables. The dataset of this paper 
consists of records of approximately 33,000 jumbo fixed rate mortgages outstanding 
in March 1993 with payment history for the following 33 months. As stated by the 
author, the value of the model proposed by this paper will be proportional to the 
importance of unobserved variables in the model to be estimated. There will always 
be variables that cannot be observed, but the importance of such variables is unknown. 
When the datasets available for estimating prepayment models are incomplete, this 
model offers an improvement.
Ambrose and Lacour-Little (2001) extend the competing risk methodology developed 
by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) into the modelling of the prepayment
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performance of adjustable rate mortgages. This paper uses microlevel data to examine 
recent prepayment performance of adjustable rate mortgages. Data consist of 2,699 
conventional adjustable rate mortgages indexed to the one-year treasury rate and 
originated between October 1992 and September 1994 by a large national financial 
institution. They find that the prepayment hazard rate increases sharply at both the 
first and second rate adjustment dates and the prepayment risk is positively related to 
the discount in teased adjustable rate mortgages. Contrary to the usual findings for 
fixed rate mortgages, loan age is initially negatively related to prepayment risk for 
adjustable rate mortgages and then reverses as loans become highly seasoned.
Ambrose and Sanders (2001) extend the competing risk model into the modelling of 
the termination of commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBSs). In their model the value of a loan is considered as the present value of its 
interest and principal repayments per face dollar of loan, less the expected value of 
losses from default per dollar of loan after adjustment for guarantees or insurance and 
less the expected value of losses associated with prepayment. The data sample covers 
4,257 commercial loans from 33 commercial CMBS deals. Their results suggest that 
increases in the slope of the yield curve or interest rate volatility would lower the 
probability of mortgage terminations. The spread between the contract rate and the 
prevailing market rate is positively related to the probability of termination. Their 
results also suggest that mortgages with higher initial loan-to-value ratios are more 
likely to prepay. But no statistical relationship between loan-to-value ratio and the
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default option is found. Their investigation also indicates the existence of regional 
variations in the termination of commercial mortgages.
Kariya, Ushiyama and Pliska (2002) generalize the Kariya and Kobayashi (2000) 
one-factor MBS pricing model (KK model hereafter) into a three-factor model. The 
KK model considers mortgage refinancing as the only source of prepayment and 
expresses borrower heterogeneity in terms of different incentive thresholds for 
changes of mortgage rates. This paper extends the KK model in two ways: firstly, 
they separate the role of the short term interest rate as the discount factor from that of 
the mortgage rate as an incentive factor associated with prepayment; secondly, they 
incorporate a second prepayment incentive factor, the “equity” factor, which is based 
on rising property values. They argue that significant increase in equity value often 
causes the sale of a property and therefore the termination of the mortgage. This paper 
treats the heterogeneity of prepayment behaviour in terms of different incentive 
thresholds for changes in both the mortgage rates and the property values. It assumes 
that a mortgage borrower would prepay his mortgage if a change in either his house 
price or mortgage rate goes over his corresponding threshold. However, the authors 
also point out the limitations of this paper, for example, prepayments caused by 
non-financial reasons are not included; incentive thresholds are assumed to be 
constant, whereas in reality they may change depending upon time or other possible 
variables.
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Downing, Stanton and Wallace (2003) extend Stanton (1995) into a two-factor 
structural mortgage pricing model incorporating both prepayment and default. This 
model allows for a direct impact of the evolution of house prices on both aspects of 
mortgage terminations. Seasoning and heterogeneity are also included in this paper. 
The data for this study consists of 1,340 Gold Participation Certificate (Gold PC) 
pools issued by Freddie Mac between January 1991 and December 1994. These pools 
account for 17,665 mortgages. The underlying mortgages in the Gold program are 
primarily first lien residential mortgage loans secured by one-to-four family dwellings. 
They focus on those pools backed by newly-issued, standard 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage loans in pools. The empirical analysis shows that the two-factor model 
produces significant better estimates of mortgage terminations than the one-factor 
model. They suggest a drop in house price results in a decrease in total mortgage 
terminations and therefore a house factor should be included in the mortgage 
valuation procedure. They also find that the transaction cost distribution is very
sensitive to the inclusion of house price as a second factor in the model. Their work
!
indicates that including the house price process in the option pricing framework 
reduces the mean of the transaction cost distribution by about 19%. They suggest 
house prices might be an important source of the unexplained cross-sectional and 
time-series variation in the one-factor model. However, their model consistently 
underprices the mortgages relative to the observed market prices. This means that 
their model predicts more prepayment and default risk than anticipated by the market.
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Charlier and Van Bussel (2003) empirically investigate the prepayment behaviour in 
the Dutch mortgage market. They follow Green and Shoven (1986) and Schwartz and 
Torous (1992) to build up proportional hazard prepayment models. They examine the 
relationship between mortgage prepayments and four determining factors: refinancing 
incentive, burnout, seasoning and seasonality. Loan-level historical data is employed 
for the empirical investigation. The results suggest that the likelihood of mortgage 
prepayment increases with the age of the mortgage. They also find that burnout is an 
important element in describing the prepayment behaviour of Dutch mortgagors. 
Models excluding burnout factor show a positive relation between prepayment and 
the refinancing incentive. However, when the burnout factor is included, the direct 
effect of the refinancing incentive disappears. The seasonality dummies indicate 
higher prepayments in December, which reflects both the holiday and tax effect. They 
also suggest that mortgagors living in apartments are more likely to prepay. This is 
attributed to the upgrading effect: young households usually start in an apartment and 
then move to a larger house as their family situation changes and their incomes 
increase.
Marathe and Shawky (2003) study the dynamic relation among GNMA and
conventional mortgage rates and the long and short term interest rates. Regression
analysis. Granger causality tests and vector autoregression test are employed to
conduct the analysis. They use monthly data for the period January 1989 to December
1996 for 30 year FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC mortgage securities and conventional
mortgages. The proxy for the short term rate is the three month t-bill rate and for the
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long term, the ten-year government bond rate. Their initial test show that correlation 
between the FNMA, GNMA and FHLMC rates is nearly perfect, suggesting that 
using all three variables might prove redundant. They therefore focus only on GNMA 
data. Their results suggest both the GNMA rates and the conventional mortgage rates 
closely follow the long term interest rates; and changes in the long term interest rate 
are reflected on both rates within a period of one month. Changes in the short term 
rates have minimal effect on mortgage rates. Their study also indicates that GNMA 
mortgages command a 50 basis points liquidity premium over conventional mortgage 
rates.
Harrison, Noordewier and Yavas (2004) provide an explanation of why loan-to-value 
rations do not always positively correlate with the probability of default. They argue 
that the correlation between LTV ratio and default risk is contingent upon default cost. 
Default cost in this paper is referred to the damage to a borrower’s credit rating. Their 
theoretical framework says that when default costs are high, risky borrowers will 
select lower LTV loans to reduce the probability of facing a costly default, while safe 
borrowers will select higher LTV loans as a signal of their enhanced creditworthiness. 
This results in an increase in the possibility of higher default risks for lower LTV 
loans. Conversely, when default costs are low, safe borrowers will select lower LTV 
ratios while risky borrowers tend to select higher loan-to-value ratio loans as they are 
more likely to encounter financial distress, and thus find the limited liability feature of 
debt more beneficial. The result of an empirical investigation of 859 single-family
residential mortgage loans is consistent with the predictions of their model.
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Hurst and Stafford (2004) point out that in addition to the financial motivation home 
owners may also want to refinance their mortgages to access their equity in order to 
smooth their consumption when they experience income fluctuation. They refer this 
motive as the “consumption-smoothing motivation.” They argue that mortgagors who 
receive a negative income shock and meantime have few liquid assets to buffer the 
shock are more likely to refinance their mortgages for cash out purposes. The authors 
suggest that the consumption-smoothing motive could help to explain the fact that 
some households refinance even in stable or rising interest rates environment. They 
also point out that the financial motive and the consumption-smoothing motivation 
are not independent. For households that have low initial liquid assets, their financial 
motivations are different from others. These households will refinance when the 
lifetime utility gain from lower mortgage payments plus the lifetime utility gain from 
accessing home equity exceeds the utility loss from paying the refinancing costs. 
Everything else being equal, these households will be induced to refinance at smaller 
interest rate differentials. The data consists of 1,448 households, of which 434 
refinanced between 1991 and 1996. Their empirical tests provide support to this 
theory. The results suggest that homeowners who have low levels of initial liquid 
assets and subsequently experience an unemployment shock are 25% more likely to 
refinance than other households even though they have to pay higher rates. The 
probability of refinancing diminishes as the households have greater amounts of 
liquid assets to buffer the unemployment shock.
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Kau, Keenan, and Smurov (2004) employ two proportional hazard models to 
separately describe the likely survival of a mortgage contract from default or 
prepayment. They treat the competing risks of prepayment and default in an entirely 
symmetric fashion. The empirical data consists of the contractual specifications and 
payment histories of 917,703 thirty-year conforming loans originating between 1970 
and 2001. The contractual details of each mortgage include its loan size, the 
loan-to-value ratio, the contract rate, and any points paid up front. The prepayment 
and default data are recorded monthly. This paper unites the proportional hazard and 
reduced-form pricing literatures, by dividing contracts into cohorts by time of 
origination, and treating the baseline of each cohort as a separate draw from a 
common stochastic process. When applied to mortgage termination, this second 
source of risk then offers the possibility of explaining how the contract on a 
default-free, prepayable mortgage can so significantly exceed the long-term Treasury 
rate. In order to capture the doubly stochastic nature of the model, this paper uses a 
“state-space” structure to model the baseline hazards of prepayment and of default. A 
particle-filter approach is used to treat such a state-space model.
Chen (2004) proposes a Monte Carlo based MBS valuation framework. The author
argues that Monte Carlo is a better choice than numerical methods such as lattice
methods for pricing and hedging MBSs since the suboptimal exercise of prepayment
and default options make numerical methods for solving PDEs inapplicable. However,
the author also recognizes that the simulated MBS price generally do not agree with
the market price. In order to make the model price artificially agree with the market
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price, the option-adjusted spread (OAS) is introduced to adjust the discounting factor. 
The author suggests that the OAS could be viewed as credit risk premium or liquidity 
premium required by the MBS issuer. In this paper mortgage prepayment is modelled 
as a multiplicative function of the factors including the refinancing incentive, the 
seasoning multiplier, the monthly multiplier and the burnout multiplier.
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) propose an option-theoretical model for modelling
mortgage prepayments and valuation of mortgage-backed securities. They argue that
earlier option-based MBS models fail to match market prices because those models
used the wrong yield curves. Previous models used either the Treasury or swap curve
to model how mortgagors decide to refinance. The authors argue these curves do not
accurately reflect the actual cost of borrowing from the perspective of a homeowner.
Instead, they employ two different yield curves, one to reflect homeowners’ cost of
borrowing and being used to capture the refinance incentive, the other to reflect MBS
investors’ cost of finance and being used to discount the MBS cash flow. Both yield
curves are specified as a fixed option-adjusted spread off the swap curve but the
spreads are different. This paper also distinguishes prepayments as refinancing
prepayment from turnover prepayment and models them separately. Refinancing
prepayment refers to the interest-rate driven prepayment and turnover prepayment
refers to all other non-interest-rate driven prepayment. Prepayment heterogeneity is
also incorporated in this paper by dividing the pool into several buckets and assigning
each bucket a different refinancing behaviour, ranging from leapers who refinance too
early, to financial engineers who refinance optimally, and to laggards who refinance
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too late. This approach would naturally result in burnout. More information of this 
model is provided in Chapter three.
Longstaff (2005) investigates the valuation of MBS when the borrower may have to 
refinance at a premium rate because of his credit situation. This paper explicitly 
allows for the possibility that the borrower may not be able to refinance at the par 
mortgage rate. The author suggests that borrowers often find it optimal to delay 
prepayment far beyond the point at which traditional optimal option models imply, 
especially when a borrower believes that mortgage rates will decrease further in the 
near ftiture. This paper also accounts for the refinancing costs and allows for the 
probability of prepaying for exogenous reasons. But borrower heterogeneity is not 
included in the model. Monthly prices for mortgage-backed securities with coupon 
rates ranging from 5.5% to 9.5% for the 1991-2002 period were collected for the 
empirical investigation. Their empirical test suggests that models that take into 
account borrowers’ credits are able to match the market values of premium 
mortgage-backed securities.
Dunn and Spatt (2005) extend their work in 1986 and develop a methodology for 
valuing mortgage-backed securities with dynamically modelling the refinancing costs. 
They argue that borrowers might refinance his or her loan multiple times in the future 
and incur costs each time. They suggest a borrower’s optimal refinancing strategy 
should reflect not only the current refinancing costs but also all the potential future 
refinancing costs under a dynamic optimal refinancing policy. This paper explicitly
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incorporates the possibility of additional subsequent refinancing in the future. But it 
does not account for prepayment heterogeneity or non-interest-rate driven prepayment. 
The result of the empirical investigation indicates that the market does not anticipate 
extremely rapid prepayment of high coupon rate securities. Prepayments of the 
highest coupon securities are usually below 60 percent.
Xu and Fung (2005) conduct an empirical analysis of the key factors that affect MBS
returns using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Monthly data on the total return
and weight-average coupon of the Lehaman Brothers MBS index from January 1988
to December 2001 are examined. The Lehman Brothers MBS index covers the
mortgage pass-throughs of GNMA, FHLMC and FNMA. They find eight factors
appear to be significant in moving the excess returns on MBS, including growth in
industrial production, growth in new home sales, change in bond horizon premium,
change in bond quality premium, change in 30-year mortgage rate, refinancing proxy,
general stock market returns and world bond market returns. Industrial productions
and new home sales are used to proxy for the real activity of the economy and the
housing sector. The bond quality premium is used to capture credit, liquidity and call
risks. Bond horizon premium is used to capture the term structure risk. While change
in mortgage rate is used to shed light on the discount rate effect, refinancing variables
are used to reflect the prepayment effect. Stock market excess returns are included to
analyze the substitution effect of the equity market on MBS. World bond market
excess returns are used to examine the impact of common world market risk factors.
Their investigation suggests that the term structure risk premium is the key driving
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force behind the MBS market. This study also indicates that the real sector has less 
influence on MBS market compared to the financial sector.
Wetmore and Ndu (2006) investigate the high refinancing activity during 1990-2001. 
They suggest that refinancing is not only influenced by the prevailing mortgage rate 
but also individual borrower and property characteristics. Their investigation shows 
that changes in refinancing activity are not only negatively related to the current 
changes in the 30-year mortgage rate but also its lags. However, the significance of 
the lags decline over time. The correlation with the lags suggests that the refinancing 
activity could be delayed for some reason. The declining significance of the lags 
signals a faster response by consumers. The authors suggest that the faster response 
could be a result of consumers becoming more sophisticated and the mortgage market 
becoming more efficient due to technological and organizational changes. This study 
also finds that the change in the refinancing index is negatively related to the change 
in the stock market index. This indicates that homeowners treat investing in a house 
as a substitute for investing in the stock market and when necessary home owners will 
cash out the mortgages for other investments.
Ho and Su (2006) study the structural prepayment risk behavior of the underlying 
mortgages for residential mortgage life insurance in the Chinese property market. 
While US mortgage insurance covers some of the risk typically faced by housing 
finance institutions, China’s residential mortgage life insurance only offers the 
insured mortgagor a life-insurance death benefit, arising from only illness or accident,
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settling the insured’s outstanding residential mortgage balance. This results in that the 
borrower’s motivation for prepayment in China is different from that in the US. This 
study applies the Cox proportional hazard model in order to estimate the structural 
behavioral model for the underlying mortgage prepayment risk in the Chinese 
mortgage market. The database consists of 1,000 mortgagors in the period from 
January 1999 to December 2003. For each loan, the dataset includes income of 
co-borrowers, region where borrower lives, growth in the gross domestic product, 
number of co-borrowers, initial loan-to-value ratio, house price inflation and length of 
the mortgage term. The empirical results of this study suggest that for China’s 
residential mortgage life insurance market the most important risk factors in affecting 
the underlying mortgage prepayment behavior are the combined monthly income of 
the co-borrowers, growth in gross domestic product, number of co-borrowers, and 
initial loan-to-value ratio.
Kau, Keenan and Smurov (2006) extend the traditional hazard technique of estimating
prepayment and default by allowing their baselines to be a stochastic process.
Traditional proportional hazard models usually specify a number of explanatory
variables describing loan or borrower characteristics, and then study how these
covariates shift the baseline. The authors also argue that the option valuation
framework indicates tighter connection between prepayment and default than a
reduced-form framework. Specifically, with option pricing, when the event of default
becomes more inevitable, the probability of the occurrence of prepayment will
become less; in particular, the value of the prepayment option falls to zero. However,
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with the reduced-form methodology, a default is always a random arrival according to 
a Poisson distribution. While the likelihood of default can rise or fall in a knowable 
way, the actual event of default always comes as a surprise. The authors suggest there 
always is a fundamental difference in how the competing risks of termination behave 
under the two forms of modeling, one approach always involves surprise and the other 
never does. Through an example of implementation of this model this paper suggests 
that the loan-to-value ratio, the contract rate, and the 10-year Treasury rate at 
origination are important factors for either prepayment or default.
Gabaix, Krishnamurthy and Vigneron (2007), during their investigation of limits of 
arbitrage in the mortgage-backed securities market, suggest that while the major 
concern of MBS valuation is prepayment modeling it is also necessary to model the 
uncertainty surrounding prepayment behavior. They directly model this prepayment 
uncertainty as an error around a mean prepayment forecast. They also identify the 
interest rates relative to the mortgage coupon, lagged interest rates, and seasoning of a 
mortgage as the three important explanatory factors of prepayment behavior. Their 
empirical data consist of daily OASs for nine 10’s and PC’s for the period August 
1993 and March 1998. They also have data on the historical prepayment rates of the 
underlying collateral at a monthly basis. The collaterals are all FNMA 30-year 
conventional loans. The empirical tests show that the prepayment risk is priced in the 
MBS market and the pricing of this risk depends on the riskiness of the entire 
mortgage market.
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Rom-Poulsen (2007) presents an intensity-based multi-factor valuation model for 
fixed-rate callable mortgage-backed securities. By modeling the pool size instead of 
the conditional prepayment rate, this model is able to derive a semi-analytic formula 
for the price of a callable MBS. A two factor affine term structure model is employed 
as the underlying interest rate model. Quadratic terms are also used to accelerate 
prepayments as interest rates fall. The proposed model can handle multiple state 
variables allowing for realistic yield curve dynamics and a flexible specification of the 
prepayment model. Although it does not explicitly model the bum out effect, this 
paper suggests that bum out could be introduced by dividing the MBS pool into 
sub-pools and assigning each with its own prepayment model. This paper does not 
account for the default option and also assumes that prepayments are solely driven by 
interest rates. Model produced MBS prices are compared with similar non-callable 
bond when the yield curve changes. The results show that this model is able to 
generate both negative and positive convexity as the spot rate changes, and also able 
to generate MBS prices close to similar non-callable bonds when the spot rate rises.
Amromin, Huang and Sialm (2007) examine the tradeoff between mortgage
prepayments and tax-deferred retirement savings. Many households face the tradeoff
between paying an extra dollar off the remaining mortgage on their houses and saving
that extra dollar in tax-qualified retirement accounts. In a world without frictions,
paying off mortgage loans early and investing in retirement accounts would be
equivalent saving decisions. However, in reality taxes and transaction costs play a key
role in the determination of the effective borrowing and lending rates. This paper uses
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the 1995,1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances to analyze the actual savings 
behavior of households with mortgage debt and with the opportunity to save in 
employer-sponsored tax-deferred retirement accounts. Their empirical results show 
that a significant number of households fail to make wealth-maximizing decisions 
with respect to their housing wealth and tax-deferred retirement accounts. The 
empirical analysis also shows that this inefficient behavior is not driven by liquidity 
or other constraints. Rather, it can be attributed to a certain extent to the reluctance of 
many households to participate in financial markets either as borrowers or as lenders.
Elliehausen, Staten and Steinbuks (2008) investigate the effect of prepayment
penalties on the pricing of subprime mortgages. They state that pricing in the
subprime market depends on a variety of factors, including the size of the loan, the
type of interest rate, the ratio of loan amount to home value and the type of home, the
extend of documentation of income or assets, income, debt payments relative to
income and purpose of the loan, and credit bureau score and other measures of
payment performance. They suggest that smaller loans require a higher interest rate to
recover relatively high fixed costs, while fixed or adjustable mortgage rate affects the
lender’s interest rate risk. The ratio of loan amount to home value and the type of
home is also believed to have influence on the borrower’s incentive to pay or maintain
the property. This study specifies loan price as a function of loan terms, distribution
channel, and borrower risk characteristics. Price is measured by the risk premium,
which is defined as the annual percentage rate of interest less the rate for a Treasury
security of comparable maturity. The database for this study contains loan-level data
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on all originations of the subprime subsidiaries of eight large financial institutions 
between the third quarter 1995 and the fourth quarter of 2004. This paper indicates 
that mortgage price and prepayment penalty may be chosen jointly, making 
single-equation estimates of the effect of prepayment penalty on price biased. Their 
results suggest that prepayment penalties are associated with significantly lower 
prices for subprime mortgages, which is consistent with pricing of mortgage credit 
according to risk, a characteristic of the subprime market that allows lenders to make 
credit available to borrowers who would have difficulty obtaining such credit in the 
prime market.
Sharp, Newton and Duck (2008) employ a singular perturbation approach to develop 
a mortgage valuation model which incorporates both prepayment and default. In this 
model, mortgages are treated as derivative assets whose prices depend on the 
evolution of both the term structure of interest rates and house prices. The 
perturbation analysis is based on the assumption of numerically small volatility of 
house price and interest rates. In this paper, house price is taken as a traded asset 
requiring no risk adjustment and modelled as a lognormal diffusion. The interest rate 
is represented by the instantaneous spot interest rate and modelled as a mean-reverting, 
square root process. The results produced by their model are compared with the high 
quality finite-difference technique, considering that the high quality finite-difference 
technique gives the “exact” solutions. The authors suggest that perturbation theory 
could be an efficient tool in the solution of a contingent claims mortgage valuation 
model in terms of speed and simplicity.
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Chen, Liao and Yang (2008) argue that the typical approach of MBS valuation in the 
market is subject to the problem of internal inconsistency since they simulate future 
interest rates under the risk-neutral probabilities but model the prepayment functions 
with physical measures. Instead, they propose to incorporate the market risk price 
parameter to derive the physical interest rate process in order to value MBSs under a 
consistent framework of physically measured interest and prepayment rates. This 
paper also investigates the potential impact of the model inconsistency on valuation 
and risk measurement in Ginnie Mae MBS. By analyzing a default-free Ginnie Mae 
MBS, they find that the mixed measures lead to slower prepayment rate estimates and 
overprices mortgage securities by approximately 5%. Moreover, substantial biases in 
the duration and convexity measures are also found. The internal inconsistency also 
leads to biased predictions of both expected and stressed returns for different 
investment horizons. The bias in expected and stressed returns can be positive or 
negative, depending on the particular security.
Sharp et al. (2009) incorporate an occupation-time derivative in the valuation
framework of a fixed-rate mortgage. In this paper a lag in prepayment is created by
including a borrower decision time. By varying the decision time the phenomenon
that borrowers act differently can be modeled. In this model prepayment is driven by
a new type of occupation-time derivative rather than an American call option. This
paper considers the delayed prepayment to be motivated by the movements in both
interest rates and house prices. The empirical results show that this model is able to
achieve mortgage values above par, which cannot be achieved under the optimal
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option framework. Increasing the decision time will result in the increase of the value 
of the mortgage above par. The authors also suggest that the exact occupation-time 
derivative for different borrowers can vary and it is possible to use different decision 
times according to different borrower characteristics.
Tsai, Liao and Chiang (2009) derive a closed-form formula of the mortgage value for 
analyzing the yield, duration and convexity of risky mortgages. Both the intensity 
rates of prepayment and default are incorporated into the model and assumed to be 
linear functions of influential variables such as interest rates. Furthermore, since 
trigger evens, such as job loss or divorce, also influence a borrower’s ability to fulfill 
monthly payment obligations and the mortgage termination incentive by prepayment 
or default, the likelihood of a borrower’s prepayment and default will change under 
these situations. Therefore, this paper models the occurrence of non-financial events 
as jump processes into the specification of intensity rates of prepayment and default. 
This paper also analyzes the effects of prepayment penalties and borrowers’ partial 
prepayment behavior on the yield, duration and convexity of a mortgage. The results 
suggest that yield decreases, and duration and convexity increase when a mortgage 
has a prepayment penalty. However, the influence of a borrower’s partial prepayment 
behavior on the yield, duration and convexity of the mortgage are ambiguous due to 
the positive and negative effects of partial prepayment on risks of prepayment and 
default.
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Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2011) discuss the rationale behind the design and origination
of subprime mortgage, and explain the boom and bust in the subprime mortgage
market in light of the evidence from loan-level data on subprime mortgage contracts.
This paper provides evidence on subprime mortgage design as credit-accommodation
products. It demonstrates how legislation permitted the use of subprime originations
in the form of cash-out refinances as a means of debt consolidation for
liquidity-constrained and credit-impaired households. This paper also shows that
riskier households opted for subprime products that allowed temporary credit relief.
As the same time, securitization provided investors with short-term exposure to
high-yields on subprime products. Ultimately, for both borrower and the lender,
prepayment was the desired exit option. This paper suggests that economic conditions,
especially house price growth, are the drivers of payment patterns on subprime
mortgages. They use a competing-risk hazard model to demonstrate how house price
growth since origination and its interaction with credit variables influence prepayment
and default hazards on subprime mortgages. Their results suggest that among
subprime originations in the highest credit score quartile, the default hazard on those
with low and negative house price growth can vary between 18 and 25 times the
default hazard on those with above-median changes in house price growth since
origination. Correspondingly, the prepayment hazard for those with low and negative
house price growth can vary between 0.26 and 0.38 times the default hazard on those
with above-median changes in house price growth since origination. This confirms
that even among borrowers of similar credit quality, those originations that experience
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low or even negative house price growth have drastically higher default and lower 
prepayment hazards in comparison with those originations that experienced high 
house price growth.
Kau, Keenan and Li (2011) apply a shared-frailty survival model to model the
unobservable heterogeneity in mortgage terminations. The authors argue that when
modeling mortgage terminations it is almost impossible to account for all the
influencing variables. Introducing the shared-frailty approach to model the
unobservable heterogeneity may improve the performance of the model. Furthermore,
the existing literature usually assumes that the survival times of mortgages are
independent. However, in practice it can be the case that the members in the same
subgroup of the population are associated since members of these groups share a
common unobserved factor. For example, mortgages originating in the same region
can be associated in terms of termination time. The shared-frailty model provides a
method for modeling the within-group associations. In particular, this paper uses
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as the group variable. They investigate whether
mortgages originating in the same MSA shares common unobserved factors and how
these factors affect the mortgage termination risks. Other risk factors, such as the
LTV ratio, the log form of the original loan size, the points paid at origination, the
original contract rate, the interest rate spread, the monthly state unemployment rate
and the housing price index (HPI) ratio at the state level are also examined along with
the MSA-level frailty. 30-year fixed rate single-family residential mortgages from a
large financial service institution are examined. The data set contains 1,038,098
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observations on individual mortgages issued between 1976 and 2004. The empirical 
results suggest that it is important to control for the MSA-level frailty to account for 
the within-group correlation among individual mortgages. The unobserved 
group-level factor, together with other risk factors, has significant effects on the 
probability of mortgage terminations.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we review previous research on the valuation of mortgage-backed 
securities and related work. MBS valuation models usually fall into two categories: 
the reduced-form approach and the structural option-theoretical approach. 
Reduced-form method models prepayment as a function of a set of state variables. 
Most reduced form models use either past prepayment rates or other endogenous 
variables to explain current prepayment behaviour. Schwartz and Torous (1989) and 
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) are examples of the reduced-form models. The 
problem of the reduced-form models is that they may do a good job of fitting 
prepayment in-sample, but provide no guarantee in predicting future prepayment 
behaviour since the economic environment continually changes. The structural 
models treat mortgage prepayment as a call option, and use option pricing theory to 
price mortgages and MBSs. Examples of option-based prepayment models include 
Dunn and McConnell (1981a, b), Kau et a l (1992), Stanton (1995), and Dunn and 
Spatt (2005). While these models have attractive theoretical features.
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option-theoretical models have been criticized for having difficulty in explaining 
market prices.
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) propose an option-theoretical approach with new 
and crucial features to overcome the problems of the existing structural models. 
However, no empirical implication of this model has been investigated. In next 
chapter, we will investigate the empirical implication of this model, seek to determine 
the key influencing factors that might be missing from this model and therefore be 
able to make suggestions on how to improve the MBS valuation models.
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Chapter Three: Empirical Investigation of the Kalotay, Yang 
and Fabozzi (2004) MBS Valuation Model
To value a fixed income security one needs to evaluate the discounted expected cash 
flow according to the term structure of interest rates. For vanilla fixed income 
products, the future cash flows are predictable. The only complexity of valuing such 
products lies in modelling the term structure of interest rates. But for mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities, homeowners have the option to prepay their mortgages 
anytime before the mortgages mature, which makes the future cash flows of the 
mortgages and consequently those of the mortgage-backed securities uncertain. This 
adds another layer of complexity of pricing mortgage-backed securities: modeling the 
prepayment risk.
Existing prepayment models can be classified as econometric or option-theoretic 
models. The econometric modelling approach, also known as reduced-form models, is 
to build econometric prepayment models based on historical data. Econometric 
models are good at estimating what happened before but consistently fail to predict 
the future since economic factors can change dramatically over time. Option-theoretic 
models, also known as structural models, model mortgage prepayment as a call option. 
While option-based prepayment models have appealing theoretical features, they 
generally face two challenges: modelling the suboptimal prepayment behaviours, and 
modelling borrower heterogeneity. It is widely recognized that mortgagors do not 
exercise their prepayment options optimally. Some mortgagors may delay the exercise
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of the in-the-money options while others choose to exercise the options even when the 
options are out-of-the-money. Several previous researchers, for example Archer and 
Ling (1993) and Stanton (1995), propose to incorporate transaction costs to explain 
the delay of the exercise of the in-the-money calls and assume heterogeneous 
transaction costs to interpret borrower heterogeneity. But these models usually 
indicate extremely high transaction costs, which is unrealistic.
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) proposed an option-theoretic model with specific 
features to meet the above challenges. In their paper, prepayments are classified as 
turnover and refinancing prepayments. Turnover prepayment refers to the prepayment 
caused by non-interest-rate-driven reasons such as job relocation and divorce and 
therefore is independent of the interest rate. The objective of turnover prepayment is 
to model the suboptimal prepayment behaviour of exercising the out-of-the-money 
calls. Refinancing prepayment refers to the prepayment caused by interest-rate-driven 
reasons and is modelled as a call option. But unlike optimal-option models, this model 
incorporates transaction cost to capture the suboptimal prepayment behaviour of 
delaying the exercise of the in-the-money calls. Furthermore, in order to model 
borrower heterogeneity, a mortgage pool is divided into several buckets and each 
bucket is assigned with different prepayment behaviours. The Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) model also proposes to use two different yield curves, one to generate 
the refinancing rate of the mortgages and the other one to discount the cash flows of 
the mortgage-backed securities, because they believe that the cost of funding of
mortgage borrowers and the cost of funding of MBS investors are different.
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In this chapter we carry out an empirical examination of the Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) model. Our main purpose is to investigate whether the special features 
of this model have enabled the MBS valuation model to produce more accurate 
predictions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Mortgage mathematics are introduced in Section
3.1 to provide the basics for understanding the MBS valuation model. Section 3.2 
explains the industry-standard Public Securities Association (PSA) prepayment model. 
Section 3.3 introduces the methodology of the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) 
model. Section 3.4 explains the method of model evaluation and the significance 
statistical tests. Section 3.5 describes the empirical data. Section 3.6 reports and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 3.7 concludes this chapter.
3.1 Mortgage Mathematics
3.1.1 Scheduled Cash Flows of Mortgages without Prepayment
Fixed-rate mortgage loans are structured as fully amortizing debt instruments, where 
the principal balance is paid off over the life of the loan. The scheduled monthly 
payment of a fixed-rate mortgage can be computed as an ordinary annuity, as shown 
in the following formula.
Where SPMT is the scheduled monthly payment
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LB is the principal loan balance
r is the annual mortgage rate
n is the term of the loan in months
The scheduled monthly payments consist of principal repayment and accrued interest. 
While the amount of the scheduled monthly payment is constant over the life of the 
loan, the allocation between the interest and the principal repayment changes over 
time. Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) illustrate the allocation between the principal payment and 
the interest payment. Eq. (3.4) shows the outstanding loan balance after the monthly 
payment at month t.
SPP, = SPMT -  IP, ,3 ^
LB( = LBj_^  -  SPP, Q 2t)
Where IP/ is the interest payment at month t
LB/.; is the outstanding loan balance from previous month
SPP/ is the scheduled principal payment at month t
LB/ is the outstanding loan balance after the payment at month t
To take a 6 percent 30-year $100,000 mortgage loan for an example. Figure 3.1
graphically illustrates the scheduled monthly payment of it and the allocation between
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the interest payment and the principal payment. As shown in the figure, the total 
monthly payment remains constant over the term of the loan. But it is comprised 
mostly of the interest payment during early periods after the origination of the loan. 
As the mortgage ages, the interest payment portion declines and the principal payment 
component increases.
3.1.2 Cash Flows of Mortgages with Prepayment
We often find that mortgages are not repaid according to the schedule. Mortgage 
borrowers have the right to partially or ftilly prepay their loans any time before the 
loans mature, which creates uncertainty with respect to the mortgage payment cash 
flows. Conditional Prepayment Rate (CPR) and Single Monthly Mortality (SMM) are 
frequently employed in measuring mortgage prepayments. SMM measures the 
prepaid principal in a particular month as some fraction of the previous month’s 
outstanding principal balance {LBt-i) less this month’s scheduled principal payment 
{SPPI), shown in Eq. (3.5). The prepayment is made in addition to the regular 
principal amortization and therefore do not affect the scheduled monthly payment. 
But the remaining loan balance in this month is given by taking off not only the 
scheduled principal repayment but also the prepaid principal, shown in Eq. (3.6).
PREPAY, = SMM  X {LB,_  ^ -  SPPt) ^
LB, = LB,_, -  SPP, -  PREP A Y, ^
Where PREP AYt is the prepaid principal at month t
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SMMis the monthly prepayment rate
CPR is the annualized prepayment rate of SMM. CPR needs to be converted into the 
monthly rate SMM in order to work out the mortgage prepayment in each month. The 
relationship between CPR and SMM can be represented as follows.
CPR = \ - ( \ - S M M y ^
3.1.3 Cash Flows of MBS Pools
When calculating the cash flow of a mortgage pool, the weighted average coupon rate 
(WAC) is used as the amortizing rate and the weighted average maturity (WAM) is 
used as the term of the pool. The weighted-average coupon (WAC) is the average of 
the coupons of the mortgages in the pool, weighted by their outstanding loan balances. 
The weighted-average maturity (WAM) is the weighted-average of the maturities of 
the mortgages in the pool, as their outstanding loan balances being the weighting 
factors. A mortgage pool’s current WAC and WAM can differ from its original WAC 
and WAM as the mortgages in the pool pay down at different speeds.
Furthermore, the cash flow of a mortgage pass-through security depends on but is not
identical to the cash flow of the underlying mortgage pool. Agencies are required to
pass the full principal payment, including scheduled principal payment and any
principal prepayment if applicable, but only part of the interest payment to the MBS
holders. The interest rate paid to MBS investors are usually referred as MBS coupon.
The difference between the WAC of the underlying mortgage pool and the MBS
coupon is the portion taken by the agencies and servicers as fees.
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3.2 The PSA Prepayment Model
Historical prepayment patterns show that immediately after the loans are originated 
borrowers are less likely to prepay their mortgages, therefore the prepayment rate is 
low; but as the mortgages become seasoned more mortgagors will choose to prepay, 
resulting in higher prepayment rate. The PSA prepayment model, introduced by the 
Bond Market Association"^ (formerly Public Securities Association), is designed to 
model the phenomenon of the mortgage prepayments ramping up with the age. The 
PSA benchmark assumes that prepayment rates are low for newly originated 
mortgages but will speed up as the mortgages become seasoned. The base PSA model, 
often referred as 100 percent PSA, assumes a CPR of 0.2 percent in the first month 
after origination and an increase of an additional 0.2 percent in each month thereafter 
until the 30‘^  month. In month 30 the prepayment rate reaches 6 percent and will 
remain constant at this level for the rest of the term. Multiples are calculated from this 
prepayment rate; for example, 200 percent PSA implies a prepayment speed double 
that of the base model (i.e., 0.4 percent in month one, ramping by 0.4 percent per 
month to a terminal speed of 12 percent in month 30). Figure 3.2 graphs the 
prepayment rates of 100 percent and 200 percent PSA models.
Mathematically, the prepayment rates under the PSA prepayment model at month t 
can be computed as follows.
4 On November 1, 2006 the Bond Market Association merged with the Securities Industry Association to form the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
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100% CPR, = t x — , i f t < 3 0  30
CP R, = 6 %, i f t > 30  (3.8)
m% PSA
CPR, = —  x t x — , i f t < 3 0  
100 30
CPR, = — x 6 %, i f  t>  30
' 1 0 0  (3.9)
Figure 3.3 plots the monthly payment and the allocation between the interest payment 
and the principal payment of a 6 percent 30-year $100,000 mortgage loan with a 100 
percent PSA prepayment speed. As shown in the figure, with a 100 percent PSA 
prepayment the total monthly payment during early months increases dramatically 
due to the prepayments. But it gradually decreases after reaching the peak in month 
30.
3.3 Methodology of the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) Valuation 
Model
While the PSA prepayment model attempts to model the age effect of mortgage 
prepayment, it has been criticized for ignoring the correlation between the prepayment 
behaviour and the level of interest rate. As a matter of fact, most mortgage 
prepayments are triggered by interest rate drop. When interest rate falls, mortgagors 
have the incentive to prepay their existing loans and refinance at a lower rate in order 
to maximize their wealth.
Optimal-option prepayment models are able to model the contingency of mortgage
prepayments on interest rates, but they have difficulties in modelling suboptimal
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prepayment behaviours. Some of the homeowners may exercise the options even 
when they are out-of-the-money; some of them may delay the exercise of the 
in-the-money options. Meanwhile homeowners are heterogeneous in exercising their 
options, i.e. they will not exercise the options at the same time.
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) proposed an option-theoretic model which takes 
these challenges into their consideration. In this paper, prepayments are classified as 
non-interest-rate-driven prepayments and interest-rate-driven prepayments. 
Non-interest-rate-driven prepayment is called turnover prepayment. The objective of 
the turnover prepayment is to model the suboptimal prepayment behaviour of 
exercising the out-of-the-money calls. Interest-rate-driven prepayment is called 
refinancing prepayment. Refinancing prepayment is modelled as a call option. But in 
contrast to the optimal-option model, this model incorporates transaction costs to 
capture the delay of the exercise of the in-the-money calls. Furthermore, this model 
divides the mortgage pool into several buckets and assigns each bucket with different 
prepayment behaviours in order to model borrower heterogeneity. Another special 
feature of this model is that two different yield curves are employed to separate the 
role of the cost of funding of mortgage borrowers and the cost of funding of MBS 
investors. The rest of this section outlines the details of the Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) model.
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3.3.1 Modelling the Turnover Prepayment
The turnover prepayment refers to the prepayments caused by non-interest-rate-driven 
reasons such as sale of property and default. In these situations, homeowners have to 
terminate their existing mortgages regardless of the prevailing market rate. The model 
of the turnover prepayment aims to capture the exercise of the prepayment options 
even when the market rate is unfavourable to the mortgagors. Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) suggest the turnover prepayments are weakly correlated with the level 
of interest rates and occur at relatively constant rates over time. They therefore 
propose to use the industry-standard PSA prepayment benchmark to model the 
turnover type prepayments. More specifically, turnover prepayments are modelled as 
a vector of monthly prepayment rates depending on the age of the mortgage. They 
suggest a 75 percent PSA prepayment speed is appropriate for the turnover 
prepayment. We will follow them to use a 75 percent PSA prepayment speed to 
construct the valuation model. But we also intend to experiment with other PSA 
speeds, such as 50 percent PSA or 150 percent PSA, to examine whether a 75 percent 
PSA is a desirable level for the non-interest-rate-driven prepayments.
3.3.2 Modelling the Refinancing Prepayment
The refinancing prepayment refers to the prepayment triggered by low interest rates.
When market rates are lower than the mortgage contract rate, mortgage borrowers
have the incentive to prepay their existing loans and refinance new mortgages at
lower rates. The refinancing prepayment can be modelled as a call option. But the
problem is homeowners do not always exercise their options optimally. Different
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mortgage borrowers have different refinancing tendencies. Some are sensitive to 
interest rate changes and will refinance their loans immediately after the market rates 
become attractive. Others are willing to wait for a further decline. Moreover, 
refinancing is usually associated with costs. Refinancing cost can also pull the 
mortgagors back from exercising the prepayment options that are already 
in-the-money.
To address these issues, Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) model the refinancing 
prepayment as a suboptimal call option. They incorporate transaction costs to reflect 
the delay of the exercise of the in-the-money calls. In this paper, the transaction cost 
is assumed as 100 basis points. In other words, refinancing will not be triggered until 
the market rate is 100 basis points lower than the contract rate. We will follow them 
to assume the refinancing cost is 100 basis points. Meanwhile, in order to model 
borrower heterogeneity, this paper divides the mortgage pool into several buckets and 
assigns each bucket with a different prepayment behavior. For example, they start 
with assuming the buckets are spaced at 50 bps intervals and the prepayment 
probability declines from bucket to bucket by 50%. In other words, the initial CPR 
when the prepayment option just becomes in-the-money will start from 50% and each 
additional 50 basis points decrease in the market rate will trigger an additional 
prepayment equivalent to 50% of previous level’s CPR. The distribution can be 
modified by either adjusting the spacing of the buckets or the rate of decline. 
Following their method we also assume a 50 bps spacing of the buckets and a 50%
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rate of decline. Of course we will also experiment with other distributions to test the 
robustness of these assumptions.
Take a mortgage pool with the weighted average coupon of 7% for an example, 
according to our assumptions homeowners will start to refinance when the market rate 
is 6% and the initial prepayment rate is 50%.^ When the market rate declines to a 
lower level, more mortgagors will join the refinancing. The corresponding CPRs 
associated with different levels of market rate are shown in the following list.
Market Interest Rate 0.06 0.055 0.05 0.045 0.04 0.035 0.03
Refinancing Rate 50% 75% 88% 94% 97% 98% 99%
3.3.3 Modelling the Term Structure of Interest Rate
Once we have the prepayment risk modelled, we need an interest rate lattice, which 
represents the possible future short rates, to project the interest rate contingent 
refinancing rates and accordingly estimate the future cash flows of the 
mortgage-backed securities. We also need the interest rate lattice to discount the 
estimated cash flows to derive the value of the security. The interest rate lattice can be 
obtained by calibrating an arbitrage free interest rate model to the current term 
structure of interest rate. But while mortgage cash flows and MBS cash flows occur 
every month during the life of the mortgage loans, the market-available yield curves
5 The 50% rate here and the refinancing rates in the table below are Conditional Prepayment Rates (CPRs), which are 
annualized prepayment rates. In order to calculate the prepayment amount in each month, the Single Monthly Mortality rate 
(SMM) should be used. The conversion between CPR and SMM are shown in Eq. (3.7). For example, a 50% CPR is equivalent 
to a SMM o f  5.61%. A 5.61% SMM rate implies that for a $1,000,000 mortgage MBS, the monthly prepayment is $56,100.
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have much less frequent maturities. Thus we need to estimate a continuous yield 
curve that matches the cash flow points of the mortgages first, and then apply it to the 
interest rate model calibration.
3.3.3.1 Estimating the Continuous Yield Curve
A number of techniques are available to estimate the continuous yield curves. 
McCulloch (1971) uses cubic splines; Vasicek and Fong (1982) use exponential 
splines. But both of them suffer unstable and fluctuating forward rates. Nelson and 
Siegel (1987) developed a parsimonious yield curve fitting model, which is able to 
accommodate forward curves with monotonie and humped shapes. Svensson (1994) 
extended the Nelson and Siegel (1987) function to increase the flexibility of the 
model by adding two extra parameters.
Bliss (1996) has conducted an investigation on comparing alternative term structure 
estimation methods. He suggests that parsimonious specifications are better options 
compared with others. loannides (2003) makes the same suggestion during his study 
in comparing different yield curve estimation techniques. Particularly, loannides 
(2003) suggest Svensson (1994) has the best out-of-sample performance among the 
seven functions that have been examined in this study. Svensson (1994) has been 
appreciated by many researchers for being flexible enough to fit the yield curve and 
being parsimonious enough to avoid over-fitting. For example, Clare and Lekkos 
(2000) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) have employed the Svensson
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methodology to estimate the benehmark yield curve in their studies. We will follow 
them to use Svensson (1994) to model the continuous yield curves.
According to Svensson (1994), the term structure of zero-coupon yields is given by
R, =Bq+ B,
l -ex p (-f /r ,) + B, 1— + B,L (^/n) J L (^ / l )  h J L ( ^ / u )  u  J
(3.10)
The dependent variable Rt is the zero coupon spot yield at time t. The parameter t on 
the right side of the equation is the maturity measured in years and fraetion of a year. 
The parameters Bo, Bj, B2 , B3 , t/, and T2 are parameters to be estimated by the 
minimization process.
In practice the Libor swap curve is popularly used as the benchmark of the market. 
Thus we will calibrate the continuous yield curve to the Libor swap curve. The 
continuous yield curve will be estimated on a monthly basis and for a thirty-year 
horizon to match the cash flow points of mortgages and mortgage-baeked securities.
3.3.3.2 Modelling the Interest Rate Lattice
No-arbitrage interest rate models are widely used for pricing securities in practice.
Within the arbitrage free class of interest rate models. Ho and Lee (1986), Black
Herman and Toy (1990, BDT), and Hull and White (1990) are typical examples. Each
of these alternative models takes different interest rate process. But it is believed that
the potential improvements offered by them are marginal. However, the BDT model
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has proved to be popular with practitioners because of the simplicity of its calibration 
and the straightforward nature of its analytic results. So we decide to employ the BDT 
(stochastie volatility version) model to construct the short rate lattice.
The BDT model is a single-factor short-rate model that matches the observed term 
structure of interest rates. This model describes the evolution of the entire term 
structure in a discrete-time binomial lattice framework. The interest rate process 
employed by BDT (stochastic volatility version) is shown in below.
r{n, i) = w, X exp(v, (2/ -  n) . ^ ) (3.11)
The parameter r(n,i) represent the short-term interest rate that arrives at time n and 
interest state i. The term Ut is the calibration factor that calibrates the interest rate 
process to an input zero coupon term structure of interest rates. V/ is the local volatility 
which is calibrated to a volatility curve. The term dt is the time step, 0.083 in our case 
since we are estimating a monthly curve. That is consistent with the monthly cash 
flows of mortgage-backed securities.
One of the inputs of this model is the spot yield curve. In Section 3.4.3.1 we have 
estimated a continuous monthly yield curve based on the market swap curve. But 
mortgages are subject to prepayment options and also the payments have an 
amortizing structure, it would be inappropriate to calibrate the interest rate model to 
the swap curve without any adjustment. Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) suggest an 
option-adjusted spread (OAS) should be added to the swap curve in order to
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accurately reflect the yield curves for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) have employed 
two different yield curves. Mortgagor Yield Curve and MBS Yield Curve. The 
Mortgagor Yield Curve is expected to reflect the cost of funding of mortgagors and is 
used to project reflnancing activity. The MBS Yield Curve is expected to reflect the 
cost of funding of MBS investors and is used to discount the MBS cash flows. The 
two yield curves are obtained by adding two different OASs off the swap curve. They 
suggest that the OAS of an MBS should be lower than that of its underlying pool 
since the mortgage market is less liquid than the MBS market. In our investigation we 
will follow them to assume a 30 bps MBS OAS and an 80 bps Mortgage OAS to 
obtain the MBS Yield Curve and the Mortgagor Yield Curve respectively. But we 
also have the intension to examine whether this is appropriate and how it affects the 
valuation model.
Another input of the Black Derman and Toy (1990) stochastic volatility version is the 
volatility curve. This model assumes the volatility is not constant but evolving as a 
binomial tree. The volatility curve can be calibrated to an existing volatility curve in 
the same way as the calibration of the yield curve. In our case a monthly volatility 
curve estimated with Svesson (1994) and calibrated to the market swap volatility is 
used as the input of the volatility curve. The market swap volatility information used 
as inputs to estimate the swap volatility curve are from quotes of the at the money 
implied volatility of interest rate swaps.
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The output of this model is an interest rate lattice that represents the possible future 
short rates of interest. The interest rate lattice derived from the Mortgagor yield curve 
will be used to project the refinancing probability. The interest rate lattice derived 
from the MBS yield curve will be used to discount the cash flows of mortgage-backed 
securities to obtain the value of the securities.
The valuation methodology outlined in this section is implemented as a computer 
program written in Matlab. The inputs of the program are the spot interest rates and 
their volatilities covering the entire time until the maturity of the MBS and the 
specifications of the MBSs. The program first builds the Black-Derman-Toy interest 
rate tree. Then it evaluates both the refinancing rates and the resulting cash flows 
along each path of the tree. The security value is finally given by averaging the 
discounted cash flows along the interest rate lattice.
3.3.4 Mathematical Formulation of the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) Model
Given the interest rate r(r, Z(t)) produced by the BDT model, the price at time r of a 
hypothetical zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at time T is given by
D(t ,T ,Z )  = £[exp(-2 ln(l + = Z] (3.12)
where r is the semi-annual compounded short term interest rate, Z is the standard 
Brownian process, the expectation E  is conditional on Z{f) = Z at time t.
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The dynamics of MBS yields are modelled using the standard option-adjusted spread 
(OAS) approach. Given an option-adjusted spread Smbs, the interest rates used for 
discounting MBS cash flows Vmbs are set as
^mbs ^ S-fnijs (3.13)
The value at time  ^of a “zero coupon MBS” that pays $1 at time T is therefore given 
by
T. 2) = E[exp(-2 ln(l + :=ÿ^)dZ(T) |Z ( t )  = Z ] (3.14)
Mortgage and MBS cash flows contain both the principal payments and interest
payments. They can be modelled as amortizing callable bonds. For convenience
Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) assume that mortgages are only refinanced on cash 
flow dates and there is no time lag between mortgage payments and MBS payments. 
Let to denote the current date. Let ti, ..., r# denote the mortgage and MBS cash flow 
dates and Rk denotes the remaining principal balance (after the coupon payment) at 
time tk. Assuming the refinancing cost at any time is a fixed fraction c of the 
remaining loan balance, the effective strike Sk at time tk is given by
Sk = Rk(l+c) (3.15)
Let Hi, ..., hn denote the principal payments that occur at times ti, ..., of a
pass-through MBS, given as a fraction of the original principal. Each Uk contains the
scheduled principal cash flows, as well as the unexpected prineipal prepayments. Let
m denote the weighted average coupon of the underlying mortgage pools, and M
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denote the MBS coupon rate. If we assume that the entire pool consists of 
homeowners with a laggard spraed of L, then the decision whether to refinance or not 
is made on the basis of a mortgage with a rate of m-C. The value of the mortgage pool 
would be given recursively by
j  ~ ) I r \ \[ t k Z i h ) )  Otherwise,
(3.16)
Where
— ^mbs ( f^c+l 4" MS]^  + [^RM,m,^ (t/c+l, (3.17)
If p(€)d€ is the laggard spread distribution for the mortgage at time to, then the value 
of the MBS at time to is given by
— I q fM,m,T(^o)P('^)d-f (3.18)
3.4 Model Evaluation Method and the Statistical Tests
3.4.1 Model Evaluation Method
The Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) model will be examined with empirical data, 
along with other models that employ different prepayment models. The accuracy of 
the models examined in this thesis will be judged against the market prices, under the 
hypothesis that these market prices are set by efficient and rational market agents, and 
therefore represent the true values of the securities. Although this assumption has 
been called into question in recent time, there seem no better alternatives available.
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Many researchers, such as Longstaff (2005), Dunn and Spatt (2005), Xu and Fung 
(2005), and Gabaix, Krishnamurthy and Vigneron (2007), still follow this traditional 
technique when examining their models. In this thesis we also consider market MBS 
prices representing the correct prices of those securities. Prieing errors are defined as 
the difference between model prices and market prices. Higher pricing errors indicate 
poorer performance of the model and lower pricing errors indicate better performance.
3.4.2 Statistical Test for the MEAN of the Pricing Errors
The statistical significance of the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) model against 
other models will also be tested. Two sets of indicators are used for the test. The first 
indicator, the MEAN of the model’s pricing errors, will be examined using paired 
sample t-test. A paired t-test can be used to compare two population means where you 
have two samples in which observations in one sample can be paired with 
observations in the other sample, such as a comparison of two different methods of 
measurement or treatments are applied to the same subjects. In this thesis, we intend 
to compare the performances of two models applying on the same securities. 
Therefore, paired sample t-test is a suitable test for testing the significance of the 
MEAN of the pricing errors of two models.
Suppose we have two distributions A and B and paired samples {{aj, bj), (ü2 , 62) ,. . ,  
(^«j bn)} can be drawn from them, the paired sample t-test will be based on the paired 
differences between A and B. Let dt denote the paired difference, then dt = bt~ at. the 
t-statistic is
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t  = ^  3.19
s / f n
Where d is the mean of the paired differences, s is the sample standard deviation and 
n is the sample size. The null hypothesis is the mean of the paired differences dt is 
zero (po = 0). The significance of the t-statistic can be assessed using a table of values 
from Student’s t-distribution. We should note that the significance test of the MEAN 
should always be viewed with scepticism, because pricing errors have both negative 
and positive values and the assessment of the mean may be biased due to the 
cancellation between positive and negative values.
3.4.3 Statistical Test for the Root Mean Square Error of the Pricing Errors
Another indicator used to test the statistical significance of the Kalotay, Yang and 
Fabozzi (2004) model is the root mean square error (RMSE). Root mean square error 
indicates on average how far the modelled prices are away from real market prices. 
Root mean square errors take the square of the pricing errors; therefore they do not 
have the directional bias as the MEAN of the pricing errors has. However, the 
significance of the RMSE may be poorly assessed by usual statistical tests. Usual 
statistical tests require the data to follow a normal distribution and obviously squared 
pricing errors do not follow a normal distribution. When the data do not follow a 
normal distribution, in some instances it is possible to transform the data into a 
normally distributed series. However, when this is not possible or the sample size is 
too small to determine whether or not the data is normally distributed, it is neeessary 
to use non-parametric or distribution free tests, which make very few assumptions
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about the probability distributions of the variables being assessed and therefore have 
very general applicability.
Diebold and Mariano (1995) suggest that the sign test is an appropriate 
non-parametric test to assess the significances of squared pricing errors when only a 
limited number of forecast-error observations are available. Following their 
suggestion, the one-sided sign test will be used when assessing the significance of the 
RMSEs of one model against another.
The sign test is based on the paired differences between two continuous distributions 
X  and 7, where paired samples from X  and 7, {(%;, yi), (x2 , y2), . . • , (%», 7«)}, can be 
drawn from. Let dt denote the paired difference, then dt = y t~  Xt. Pairs with no 
differences are omitted so that there is a possibility of a reduced sample. The null 
hypothesis is the median of the paired differences dt is zero. This hypothesis implies 
that given a random pair of measurements (%/, y/), both Xt and yt are equally likely to 
be larger than the other.
Under the null hypothesis, the number of positive paired difference in a sample of size 
T has the binomial distribution with parameters T and 0.5. If we let w be the number 
of pairs for which dt > 0, then w follows a binomial distribution W ~ b (T, 0.5), 
Significance may be assessed using a table of the cumulative binomial distribution.
For large sample sizes, for example T> 25, the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution can be used. In this case the studentized version of the sign-test statistic
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can be used and the statistic can be assessed with the standard normal distribution 
table.
w — 0.5T
5 = , „■_-  ~iV(0,l) (3.20)
The paired sample t-test and the sign test will be used throughout the thesis where is 
necessary to test the statistical significance of two different models. But the sign test 
for RMSEs is treated as the main method for comparing two different models since 
the RMSEs have no directional bias. When using the sign test, we estimate the 
studentized version of the sign test statistic for all the samples^ to make the statistics 
comparable, no matter the size of sample is larger than 25 observations or smaller 
than 25.
3.5 Data Description
Our empirical investigation is based on three monthly prices (June, July and August 
of 2008) of 1,380 mortgage-backed securities, a total of 4,140 observations. The 
1,380 MBSs cover securities issued by different agencies, and securities with various 
coupons and a wide range of ages. These securities include 131 30-year FHLMC 
MBSs, 644 30-year FNMA MBSs, 95 30-year GNMA I MBSs, 32 30-year GNMA II 
MBSs, 10 15-year GNMA I MBSs, 276 15-year FNMA MBSs, and 192 15-year 
FHLMC MBSs. For each security we have the issue date, maturity date, 
weighted-average maturity of the pool, weighted-average coupon of the pool, MBS
6 The statistical test conclusions are always the same when we use the binomial distribution rather than the studentized version 
o f the sign test for samples with less than 25 observations.
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coupon, remaining loan balance on the valuation date, and age. These are the 
security-specific data that are required for valuing a mortgage-backed security. In 
addition to the security specifications, we also have the Libor swap curves and the 
swap volatility curves on the valuation dates for the interest rate calibration. We carry 
out the valuation on the payment dates of the three months in order to minimize the 
effect of the accrued interest on the prices of the securities. The payment dates of the 
GNMA I, GNMA II, FNMA, and FHLMC mortgage-backed securities are 15th, 20th, 
25th, and 15th of each month respectively, or the first business day after that if it is 
not a business day. We also obtain the market prices of these securities on the 
valuation dates for measuring the accuracy of the modelling prices. All of these data 
are from Bloomberg™.
3,6 Empirical Results and Discussions
In this section we report the empirical results of the investigation of the KYF model. 
In order to provide comparisons, we also computed the prices under three other 
prepayment models. The first model, referred as the ordinary annuity OA model, 
assumes no prepayment so the underlying mortgages are treated as pure ordinary 
annuities. The second model, referred as the PSA model, assumes a standard 75% 
PSA prepayment. PSA models assign static prepayment rates to mortgages according 
to their ages. The third model, referred as the optimal option 0 0  model, considers 
mortgage prepayment as an optimal call option, i.e. homeowners will exercise their 
prepayment options immediately after the options become in-the-money. Meanwhile,
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the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) model (the KYF model hereafter) accounts for 
not only the interest-rate-driven prepayments but also the non-interest-rate-driven 
prepayments. The cash flows projected by these four prepayment models will be 
discounted by the same interest rate lattices to ensure that the differences of the 
pricing errors of the four models are only the results of the differences in their 
prepayment modelling. The purpose of this investigation is to test whether the KYF 
model, which has a more sophisticated prepayment modelling structure, is superior to 
other simpler models in terms of projecting mortgage prepayments and explaining 
MBS prices.
Pricing errors of the OA model, the PSA model, the 0 0  model and the KYF model 
are computed and compared. Pricing errors are defined as the differences between the 
model prices and the market prices of the MBSs. Table 3.1 reports the summary 
statistics of the pricing errors of these four models. We report the results by MBS 
types and also month by month so that we can look at whether these models have 
similar impacts on different types’ of MBSs and whether the results are consistent 
over time.
The results show that in most cases the OA model has the highest root mean square 
errors (RMSEs) and the PSA model has the second highest. The high RMSEs of the 
OA model and the PSA model illustrate the ineffectiveness of these two models in 
valuing mortgage-backed securities. The statistical tests also show that the pricing 
errors of the KYF model are significantly smaller than the OA model and the PSA
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model. This proves that prepayment is playing an important role in valuing 
mortgage-backed securities. Completely ignoring mortgage prepayment or modelling 
prepayment with simple PSA standards can lead to serious errors in pricing 
mortgage-backed securities.
The KYF model and the 0 0  model have relatively smaller RMSEs. But contrary to 
our expectation, the KYF model has higher RMSEs than the 0 0  model. We have 
expected that the KYF model could yield better performance than the optimal-option 
model since it models mortgage prepayments in a more comprehensive way. Table
3.1 also reveals that these four models have relatively consistent performances across 
different types of MBSs and across the investigation period. Thus, generally speaking 
the KYF model can easily outperform the OA and PSA model, but has difficulty to 
beat the 0 0  model.
We then take a closer look at the results by dividing the securities into different 
groups based on their coupons. The summary statistics of the pricing errors by MBS 
coupons are reported in Table 3.2. The coupon-categorized results show that the 
RMSEs of the OA model and the PSA model increase as coupon increases. This is 
probably because high coupon mortgages are likely to have high prepayment rates due 
to refinancing; however the interest-rate contingent prepayments are not incorporated 
by the OA model or the PSA model, which leads high coupon MBSs to be associated 
with high pricing errors.
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The RMSEs of the 0 0  model do not show great variations across coupons, but the 
RMSEs of the KYF model appear to follow an interesting pattern. When the coupon 
rates are at low levels such as 4.5 and 5 percent, the KYF model has large RMSEs, 
even larger than the ones of the OA model and the PSA model. But the RMSEs of the 
KYF model decrease as coupon rates increase. When the coupon rate reaches the level 
of 6 percent or 6.5 percent, the KYF model appears to have the best performance with 
very small RMSEs. However, the RMSEs of the KYF model start to rebound when 
the coupon rate exceeds 6.5 percent towards 7 percent or 8 percent.
Another important observation is that the standard deviations of the pricing errors of 
the KYF model at each coupon level are relatively low. The low standard deviations 
indicate that the pricing errors of the KYF at each coupon level vary at a small range. 
Significant differences in the RMSEs across coupons, together with the low variation 
within the same coupons, demonstrate that the performance of the KYF model is very 
sensitive to the MBS coupons.
Since the standard deviation of the KYF pricing errors at each coupon level is low, it 
is also useful to look at the mean of the pricing errors at each coupon level. In fact, it 
reveals even more. The KYF model has very high positive errors for low coupon 
MBSs such as 4.5 percent or 5 percent. The average of the pricing errors drops as 
coupon rates increase and it even falls to negative values when the MBS coupon 
exceeds 6.5 percent. The pricing errors continue to drop and leave MBSs with coupon 
of 7.5 percent and 8 percent to have high negative errors. The pricing errors of the
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KYF model at different coupon levels indicate that this model tends to underestimate 
the prepayments of low coupon mortgages, which results in overestimating the prices 
of MBSs; it also tends to overestimate the prepayments of high coupon mortgages and 
thus underestimate the MBS values
The persistence of the coupon-sensitiveness in all three months also confirms that this 
phenomenon is not a temporary one; rather it appears to be systematic. But the source 
of this coupon-sensitivity is unknown and requires further investigation.
3.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have empirically investigated the Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004)
model along with three other models assuming simpler prepayment activities. The
results show that the models assuming no prepayment or assuming simple PSA
prepayment behavior have high pricing errors. This suggests that prepayment is
playing an important role in the valuation of mortgage-backed securities; completely
ignoring prepayments or assuming simple PSA prepayment behavior can lead to high
pricing errors. The pricing errors of the KYF model and those of the optimal-option
model are smaller, indicating that they have better performance in valuing
mortgage-backed securities. However, the KYF model did not show superiority to the
optimal-option model. After dividing the securities into different groups by the MBS
coupons, we observe that the performance of the KYF model follow an interesting
pattern. The KYF model has poor performance for low coupon MBSs. But the
performance improves as coupon increases and reaches the best when the coupon rate
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is 6 percent or 6.5 percent. After that it reverses to poorer performance. Meanwhile 
the standard deviations of the KYF pricing errors at each coupon level are relatively 
low. This coupon bias of the performance of the KYF model persists in all the three 
months of our investigation period.
In next chapter we are interested in examining the parameters of the KYF model. The 
purpose is to investigate whether any variations of the parameters can improve the 
accuracy of the KYF model or change the coupon bias phenomenon.
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Figure 3.1 Monthly Payment o f a Fixed-Rate Mortgage Loan without Prepayment 
This figure presents the scheduled monthly payment o f a 6% 30-year $100,000 mortgage loan for the entire o f  its life, as well as 
the distribution o f  the principle payment and the interest payment. Despite the total monthly payment remains constant over the 
term o f the loan, the component o f  the principal payment increases while the component o f  the interest payment decreases over 
time.
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Figure 3.2 The CPRs of the 100 Percent and 200 Percent PSA Models 
This figure plots the prepayment rates o f  the 100% PSA and 200% PSA models over the term o f  360 months. In general, a 200% 
PSA prepayment model doubles the ramping-up speed o f  the 100% PSA prepayment model in the first 30 months, and remains at 
12% after month 30, which is also double o f  the rate o f 6% for the case o f the 100% PSA prepayment model.
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Figure 3.3 Monthly Payment o f a Fixed-Rate Mortgage Loan with 100% PSA Prepayment 
This figure plots the monthly payment o f a 6% 30-year $100,000 mortgage loan with a 100% prepayment speed. It also presents 
the distribution between the principal payment and interest payment. Different from the mortgage loan with no prepayment as 
shown in Figure 3.1, the monthly payment o f  the mortgage with prepayment rises quickly during early months but gradually 
decreases after the peak in month 30.
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Chapter Four: Examining the KYF Parameters: How Do 
They Affect the Model?
In previous chapter we have empirically investigated the KYF MBS valuation model 
together with three other models. The results show that the KYF model is able to 
outperform the model assuming no prepayments and the model assuming simple PSA 
prepayment behaviour, but seems unable to beat the optimal option model. However 
interestingly, we observe the performance of the KYF model is sensitive to MBS 
coupons. The KYF model has good performance with very small pricing errors for 
MBSs with coupons of 6 percent or 6.5 percent. But it has relatively large pricing 
errors for MBSs with higher coupons such as 7.5 percent and 8 percent and lower 
coupons such as 4.5 percent and 5 percent.
When constructing the KYF model, we have made a series of assumptions on the
model parameters, for example a specific PSA speed for the turnover prepayment, the
refinancing cost, the refinancing distribution to reflect borrower heterogeneity, and an
option adjusted spread off the swap curve to obtain the Mortgagor Yield Curve. In
this chapter we are interested in examining these parameters in order to investigate
whether the performance of this model is sensitive to these parameters. More
specifically, we will vary the values of the prepayment parameters, including the PSA
speed, the refinancing cost and the refinancing distribution, to test how the models
with new values perform. We also intend to develop an econometric model to
estimate the Mortgagor Yield Curve, replacing the yield curve previously obtained by
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adding OASs off the swap curve, and then test how the change of the yield curve 
affects the valuation model. We will mainly focus our investigation on two questions: 
first, can any of the changes improve the accuracy of the KYF valuation model; 
second, can any of the changes affect the coupon bias of this model?
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 tests the prepayment 
parameters. Section 4.2 builds up an econometric model for estimating the Mortgagor 
Yield Curve and tests how the change of the yield curve impacts the MBS valuation 
model. Section 4.3 concludes this chapter.
4.1 Testing the Prepayment Parameters of the KYF Model
The KYF model accounts for not only the interest-rate-driven prepayment but also the
non-interest-rate-driven prepayment. The non-interest-rate-driven prepayment is
modelled with PSA prepayment method. The interest-rate-driven prepayment is
modelled as a suboptimal option by incorporating refinancing cost and a refinancing
distribution to treat borrower heterogeneity. During the investigation in chapter three,
we have assumed the turnover prepayment follows a 75 percent PSA prepayment
speed and the refinancing cost is 100 bps. We have also assumed that the buckets with
different refinancing tendencies are spaced at 50 basis points intervals and the
prepayment rate declines from bucket to bucket by 50%. This model will be used as a
point of reference and referred as the reference model. In this section we will vary the
values of these parameters individually to build up new models. The performances of
these new models will be tested against the reference model in order to investigate
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whether the changes of these parameters can affect the performance of the KYF 
model.
A total of 14 new models are constructed based on the variation of the parameter 
values of the reference model. Each of these models differs from the reference model 
at only one aspect to ensure that the differences brought by the new models are only 
the effect of the one particular factor. Table 4.1 summarizes the prepayment 
assumptions of the reference model and the ones of the 14 newly constructed models. 
MO is the reference model with the original assumptions. Model 1-3 changes the 
assumption of the turnover prepayment to various PSA prepayment speeds, from 50% 
PSA to 150% PSA; Model 4-6 changes the assumptions of refinancing costs from 50 
bps to 200 bps; Model 7-10 changes the spacing of the bucket to different intervals 
from 10 bps to 90 bps; Model 11-14 changes the rate of decline to various levels from 
30% to 70%.
Empirical results in chapter three show that the MBS valuation model have similar 
impacts across different types of MBSs and across different months. Thus, the results 
produced by the investigation based on one group of the MBSs are believed to be 
generic and applicable to other agency MBSs. In this chapter we will focus the 
experimental investigation on the June 2008 prices of 30-year GNMA MBSs only. 
This group of MBSs cover a wide range of coupons from 4.5 percent to 8 percent, 
which is important if we want to assess the coupon effect of the valuation model. It 
also has a reasonable size of sample with 95 observations. Samples with too few
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observations may not be able to produce robust and reliable results; samples with too 
many observations will to be too time-costly in terms of running through the valuation 
programme.
Prices of these new models are computed and pricing errors against the market prices 
are calculated. Table 4.2 reports the root mean square errors (RMSEs) of each model, 
both the overall RMSEs and the RMSEs at each coupon level. The results show that 
the overall RMSEs of these models range from 3.411 to 3.511, suggesting a similar 
overall performance of these models. At each coupon level, the RMSEs of these 
models are also at similar levels. They all have small RMSEs for MBSs with coupons 
of 6 percent or 6.5 percent, but have relatively large RMSEs for lower coupon MBSs 
such as 4.5 percent and higher coupon MBSs such as 8 percent.
Table 4.3 reports the mean of the pricing errors of these models at each coupon level. 
The pricing errors of the new models Ml to M l4 illustrate the same pattern upon 
MBS coupons as the reference model MO. They have very high positive errors for low 
coupon MBSs such as 4.5 percent. The errors decrease as coupon rates increase and 
reach their lowest positive points at the coupon of 6 percent. The pricing errors drop 
to negative values afterwards. When coupons are 7.5 percent or 8 percent, these 
models have large negative pricing errors.
The results in this section suggest that the variation of the prepayment parameter
values neither improve the performance of the KYF model nor change its
coupon-sensitivity. The KYF model appears to be insensitive to these parameters.
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4.2 Testing the Mortgagor Yield Curve of the KYF model
During the investigation in chapter three we have assumed that the Mortgagor Yield 
Curve is 80 bps option-adjusted spread off the swap curve. This yield curve is 
expected to reflect the cost of funding of mortgagors and is used to project mortgagors’ 
refinancing activities. But whether this yield curve is able to reflect the cost of 
funding of homeowners and how it affects the MBS valuation model are unknown. In 
this section we develop an econometric model to estimate market mortgage rate using 
the technique of regression analysis. The econometric model will be used to produce 
the Mortgagor Yield Curve to replace the yield curve previously obtained by 
assuming static OAS off the swap curve. The MBS valuation model with the new 
Mortgagor Yield Curve is also tested using empirical data in order to investigate how 
this change affects the valuation model.
4.2.1 Regression Data Description
National average 30-year fixed mortgage rate FRATE is employed as the dependent 
variable. In terms of the explanatory variables, Jones and Miller (1995) have stated 
that monthly consumer confidence index (CCI) is a good proxy for broader borrower 
wealth effect expectations and use it as an independent variable when examining the 
demand side of the determinates of the mortgage rate. Nothaft and Perry (2002) have 
used the loan-to-value ratio LTV as one of their independent variables when 
examining whether mortgage rates vary by neighbourhood income and racial 
composition. Liu and Skully (2005) use the yield curve slope measured as the yield of
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10-year Treasury bonds less the three-month Treasury notes, as a proxy of the 
repayment risk of mortgages.
In addition to those variables, we also collect other independent variables from both 
financial market indicators and housing market indicators that may have impact on the 
market mortgage rate. The financial market indicators in our study include 
Fama-French factors (market excess return MER, small market capitalization minus 
big SMB, and high book-to-value ratio minus low HML), inflation rate INFLA, 
30-year libor rate LIBOR, fed funds rate FED, yield curve slope (10-year treasury rate 
minus 3-month t-bill rate, SLOPE) and UK market liquidity LIQ U f. These indicators 
are used to proxy the capital market borrowing and lending environment. Housing 
market indicators include national average loan-to-value ratios LTV, delinquency rate 
DELINQ, housing price index HPI, consumer confidence index CCI and US personal 
income PI. National average loan-to-value ratios and delinquency rates are used to 
proxy credit risk in the mortgage market. The housing price index proxies the clearing 
prices in the housing market. The consumer confidence index and US personal 
income proxy the demand side of the housing market. These indicators are used to 
examine how the state of the housing market affects mortgage rates. The independent 
variables are summarized in the following list.
7 Using a US market liquidity indicator would be more desirable since we are examining the securities in the US market. 
However, the US market liquidity index is not readily available. Considering the high correlation between the UK financial 
market and the US financial market, we therefore employ the UK market liquidity index in our study. This index is released by 
the Bank o f  England every April and October.
I l l
Independent Variables 
MER market excess return
SMB small market capitalization minus big market capitalization
HML high book-to-value ratio minus low book-to-value ratio
INFLA Inflation
LIBOR 30-year libor rate
FED fed funds rate
SLOPE yield curve slope (10-year treasury rate minus 3-month t-bill rates)
LIQUI UK financial market liquidity
LTV national average loan-to-value ratios
DELINQ delinquency rate
HPI housing price index
CCI consumer confidence index
PI US personal income
The Fama-French factors are collected from Kenneth R. French’s online data library. 
All other data are collected from Bloomberg Financial Services. The regression 
analysis is carried out on monthly data for the period June 1998 to May 2008, a total 
of 120 monthly observations. The delinquency rates (DELINQ) are only available 
quarterly. This series is therefore converted into monthly data using the cubic spline 
method provided by EViews.
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4.2.2 Regression Model Description
The correlations among the independent variables are firstly computed. High 
correlation between independent variables is likely to cause multicollinearity. The 
correlation matrix of the independent variables is reported in Table 4.4. The 
correlations that are greater than 0.7 are highlighted in the table. The results show that 
only two pairs of variables have high correlations: Libor rate LIBOR with the housing 
price index HPI, and Fed Funds rate FED with the yield curve slope SLOPE. But 
multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a 
whole; it only affects the standard errors regarding individual predictors (Brooks, 
2002). Therefore we decide to proceed with the regression analysis using all the 
independent variables whilst bearing in mind the potential for multicollinearity.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is also conducted to test the stationarity of 
the variables.^ According to the unit root test results, MRE, SMB, HML and PI are 
stationary in both levels and first differences; INFLA, LIBOR, FED, SLOPE, LIQUI, 
LTV and CCI are non-stationary in levels but are first difference stationary; HPI and 
DELINQ are non-stationary in both levels and first differences but are second 
difference stationary. To improve the stationarity of the variables, the second order 
differences of HPI and DELINQ and the first order differences of other dependent
8 Brooks (2002) stresses that it is essential to examine a series is stationary or not before performing a regression. He explains 
that a series is stationary or not can strongly influence its behaviour and properties and the use o f  non-stationary data can lead to 
spurious regressions. Furthermore, if  non-stationary variables are employed in a regression model, the standard assumptions for 
asymptotic analysis will not be valid.
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variables and the independent variables are used. Equation (4.1) describes the model 
we estimate.
D(FRATE) = a + PiD(MER) + P2D(SMB) + p3 D(HML) + p4D(LIB0R) + 
p5D(SL0PE) + p6D(FED) + P7D(LIQUI) + pgD(INFLA) + p9D(LTV) + pioD(HPI,2) 
+ piiD(DELINQ,2) + pi2D(CCI) + Pi3D(PI) + e (4.1)
4.2.3 Regression Results and Discussions
Estimation results for model (4.1) are reported in Table 4.5. A quick look at the 
results reveal that changes in 30-year fixed mortgage rates exhibit a significant 
positive relation with changes in Libor rates, but there are no significant relations for 
all other factors. The R  ^ of 0.8223 indicates a tight fit of this model. We also 
performed the Bera-Jarque test to examine whether the disturbances of this model are 
normally distributed, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test to examine 
whether the errors are correlated, and the Hetroscedasticity test to examine whether 
the variance of the errors is constant. The results show that the errors of this model are 
normally distributed and there is no serial correlation or hetroscedasticity present in 
this model.
A stepwise-backwards variable selection procedure is then employed to construct a 
more robust econometric model. The selection criterion is set as 10 percent 
significance level. As a result, LIBOR is the only variable that survived the stepwise 
selection. The model can then be written as:
D(FRATE) = a + PiD(LIBOR) + e (4.2)
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Table 4.6 provides the estimates for the relation between 30-year Libor rates and 
30-year fixed mortgage rates. The regression results again demonstrate a strong 
positive relation between changes in the Libor rate and changes in the mortgage rate. 
The coefficient of LIBOR indicates that every 100 basis points change in Libor rate 
will bring roughly 80 basis points change in mortgage rate. The R  ^ of this model is 
0.8004 and the adjusted R  ^ is 0.7989, suggesting the high fit of this model. Both the 
results of the estimations of Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2) illustrate that Libor rate is the 
single most important factor in moving market mortgage rate. Changes in other 
financial market indicators and housing market indicators seem to have little or no 
direct impact on mortgage rate.
The exceptional significance of the LIBOR variable leads us to question how the 
other independent variables will perform if we drop LIBOR from the regression. It is 
possible that some of these variables have strong influential power on both FRATE 
and LIBOR, but when LIBOR is present their influences on FRATE are not evident. 
We therefore run a regression that excludes the LIBOR variable. The regression 
equation is shown below in Eq. (4.3).
D(FRATE) = a + PiD(MER) + p2D(SMB) + P3D(HML) + P4D(SL0 PE) + P5D(FED) 
+ P6D(LIQUI) + P7D(INFLA) + PsD(LTV) + P9D(HPI,2) + PioD(DELINQ,2) + 
PiiD(CCI) + Pi2D(PI) + 8 (4.3)
Table 4.7 reports the estimation results of Eq. (4.3). The results show that after
dropping the LIBOR variable, the variables of FED and SLOPE become significant at
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the 1% level, the HPI is significant at the 5% level and the CCI is significant at the 10% 
level. This confirms our previous doubt that the influences of some other explanatory 
variables on FRATE are overshadowed by LIBOR. However, this only indicates that 
these variables affect both FRATE and LIBOR, not the spread between them. 
Moreover, the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared of this regression drop to 0.5142 
and 0.4587 respectively, much lower than the ones of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2). This 
certainly indicates that the explaining power of the regression excluding LIBOR has 
been greatly reduced. Considering that our objective is to improve the modeling of the 
MBS valuation model through a dynamic modelling of the Mortgagor Yield Curve 
and not to investigate the determinants of the FRATE, the inclusion of these variables 
will not be warranted. Thus, we will continue our investigation using the stepwise 
selected Eq. (4.2).
The Bera-Jarque test, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test and the
Hetroscedasticity test have been performed to model (4.2), but no abnormality, serial
correlation or hetroscedasticity is found in the model. The literature also suggests that
structural breaks in regression coefficients may occur and should be examined. Thus,
Chow’s forecast test is employed to examine the stability of model (4.2). We follow
the common procedure to use the first half of the data for estimation and select the
breakpoints for forecast during the second half of the data. Breakpoints are selected
every half year so that we can have an even periodic analysis. That is, June and
December of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 are chosen as the breakpoints. We are also
interested to know how the model performs in the most recent months, so January,
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February, March and April of 2008 are also chosen as the breakpoints. The F-statistics 
of each Chow’s test and their probabilities are reported in Table 4.8.
The Chow’s tests show that this model is relatively stable for most of the time, except 
for the months from December 2007 to February 2008. The instability during this 
period of time could be the results of the global financial crisis which was striking the 
market right at that time. Libor’s volatility has increased dramatically and the 
relationship between Libor and other market rates became unusual. The model regains 
its stability during the tests in March and April of 2008, demonstrating that the 
instability is only a temporary phenomenon and for the long run this model has 
relatively stable performance.
4.2.4 Investigation of the MBS Valuation Model with Integration of the 
Regression Model
In this section we will use this regression relation of Eq. (4.2) to estimate the 
Mortgagor Yield Curve and test how the MBS valuation model with the new 
Mortgagor Yield Curve performs. This new model is referred as Ml 5. Its performance 
will also be compared with the reference model MO.
The empirical data used in this section are the same as the data used in Section 4.1, 
the June 2008 prices of GNMA 30-year mortgage-backed securities. This group of 
mortgage-backed securities has 95 observations covering a wide range of coupon 
rates from 4.5 percent to 8 percent.
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Prices of M l5 are computed and pricing errors against the market prices are 
calculated. Table 4.9 reports the summary statistics of the pricing errors of M l5 by 
MBS coupons. The summary statistics of MO are also provided in this table as a 
reference. The overall root mean square error of the new model is 3.71, while the 
overall root mean square error of the reference model is 3.47. This suggests that the 
new model does not show improvement in terms of overall modelling accuracy. 
Meanwhile, the means of the pricing errors of the new model at each coupon level 
illustrate similar coupon-sensitive feature as the reference model. The model has high 
positive pricing errors for low coupon MBSs and the pricing errors decrease as 
coupon increases. The pricing errors then drop to negative values at the coupons of 7 
and 8 percent.
However, the new model has much smaller pricing errors for coupons of 7 percent 
and 8 percent compared with the reference model. This indicates that the new 
Mortgagor Yield Curve produced with a dynamic regression relation has brought 
some degree of flexibility to the MBS valuation model. But this improvement seems 
to be limited to high coupon mortgages only. This new model with changing the way 
of modelling the Mortgagor Yield Curve has failed to improve the MBS valuation 
model. But it is possible that other models using different approaches to model the 
Mortgagor Yield Curve can do a better job. This is open to future discussion and 
research.
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4.3 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we experiment with alternative values of the prepayment parameters in 
the KYF model. The results show that the performance of the KYF model is 
insensitive to these parameters. Changes of the assumptions of these parameters 
neither improve the accuracy of this model nor change the coupon bias.
We also conduct a regression analysis of the dynamic relation between the market 
mortgage rate and a wide range of economic factors. The results show that the 30-year 
mortgage rate is primarily moving with the 30-year Libor rate. The regression relation 
between the mortgage rate and the Libor rate is then used to estimate the Mortgagor 
Yield Curve in the MBS valuation model. The empirical results show that the model 
with the new Mortgagor Yield Curve has a similar coupon-sensitive profile as the 
reference model. Although overall the new model does not bring dramatic 
improvement to the performance of the KYF model, it greatly reduces the pricing 
errors for high coupon MBSs.
All in all, the results in this chapter indicate that the KYF model is not very sensitive 
to its own parameters. Changes in these parameters only bring marginal changes to 
the performance of this model. In next chapter, we will follow the principles of the 
KYF model but propose a different method to model borrower heterogeneity. The 
new MBS valuation model will be empirically tested in order to investigate whether 
this can bring improvement to the MBS valuation model.
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Table 4.1 Prepayment Parameters o f the Experimental Models
This table lists the prepayment assumptions o f  the reference model (MO) with the original assumptions and the ones o f  the 14 
newly constructed models (M l -  M14). Models M l -  M3 change the assumption o f  the turnover prepayment to various PSA 
prepayment speeds from 50% PSA to 150% PSA. Models M4 -M 6 change the assumption o f  refinancing cost from 50 bps to 
200 bps. Models M7 -  MIO change the spacing o f  the bucket to different intervals from 10 bps to 90 bps. Models M i l -  M14 
change the rate o f decline to various levels from 30% to 70%. The variations made in each experimental model are highlighted in 
bold.
Model Turnover Prepayment
Refinancing Prepayment
Refinancing Cost Bucket Spacing Rate of Decline
MO 75% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.5
Ml 50% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.5
M2 100% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.5
M3 150% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.5
M4 75% PSA 50bps 50bps 0.5
M5 75% PSA 150bps 50bps 0.5
M6 75% PSA 200bps 50bps 0.5
M7 75% PSA 100bps 10bps 0.5
M8 75% PSA 100bps 30bps 0.5
M9 75% PSA 100bps 70bps 0.5
MIO 75% PSA 100bps 90bps 0.5
M il 75% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.3
M12 75% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.4
M13 75% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.6
M14 75% PSA 100bps 50bps 0.7
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Table 4.5 Regression Results o f Eq. (4.1)
This table reports the results o f the initial regression that includes all the independent variables. Changes in 30-year fixed 
mortgage rates exhibit a significant positive relation with changes in the Libor rates. Both the and the adjusted o f this 
model are high, indicating a tight fit o f  this model. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.0010 0.0087 0.1200 0.9047
D(MER) 0.0007 0.0015 0.4431 0.6586
D(SMB) 0.0010 0.0019 0.5046 0.6149
D(HML) -0.0010 0.0017 -0.5680 0.5713
D(LIBOR) 0.8003 0.0596 13.4313 0.0000***
D(SLOPE) 0.0002 0.0515 0.0045 0.9965
D(FED) 0.0272 0.0550 0.4952 0.6215
D(LIQUI) -0.0979 0.0604 -1.6222 0.1078
D(INFLA) 0.0186 0.0234 0.7925 0.4299
D(LTV) -0.0147 0.0129 -1.1352 0.2589
D(HPI,2) 0.0249 0.0174 1.4324 0.1550
D(DELINQ,2) -0.2382 0.1934 -1.2314 0.2210
D(CCI) 0.0016 0.0017 0.9757 0.3315
D(PI) -0.0133 0.0089 -1.4889 0.1395
R-squared: 0.8223 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.8001
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Table 4,6 Regression Results o f Eq. (4.2)
This table reports the estimates for the relation between 30-year Libor rates and 30-year fixed mortgage rates. The regression 
results demonstrate a strong positive relation between changes in the Libor rate and changes in the mortgage rate. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.0007 0.0086 -0.0787 0.9374
D(LIBOR) 0.8036 0.0371 21.6626 0.0000***
R-squared: 0.8004 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.7987
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Table 4.7 Regression Results o f Eq. (4.3)
This table reports the estimation results o f  the regression that excludes the variable LIBOR. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level The variables o f  fed funds rate FED 
and the yield curve slope SLOPE become significant at the 1% level, the housing price index HPI is significant at the 5% level 
and the consumer confidence index CCI is significant at the 10% level. However, both the R  ^ and the adjusted R^are relatively 
low, indicating poorer explaining power.
Independent
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.0007 0.0144 0.0491 0.9609
D(MER) 0.0006 0.0025 0.2172 0.8285
D(SMB) -0.0026 0.0031 -0.8472 0.3988
D(HML) -0.0026 0.0028 -0.9434 0.3476
D(SLOPE) 0.5157 0.0565 9.1352 0.0000***
D(FED) 0.3970 0.0783 5.0712 0.0000***
D(LIQUI) 0.1095 0.0960 1.1404 0.2567
D(INFLA) 0.0462 0.0384 1.2042 0.2312
D(LTV) 0.0017 0.0212 0.0782 0.9378
D(HPI,2) 0.0599 0.0283 2.1160 0.0367**
D(DELINQ,2) -0.2174 0.3184 -0.6829 0.4962
D(CCI) 0.0049 0.0028 I.79I4 0.0761*
D(PI) -0.0I3I 0.0147 -0.8944 0.3731
R-squared: 0.5142 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4587
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Table 4.8 Chow's Forecast Test Results
This table reports the F-statistics o f  the Chow’s tests and their probability. The results show that this model is relatively stable for 
most o f  the time, except when the market was extremely volatile due to financial crisis from December 2007 to February 2008. 
But the model regains its stability afterwards. * indicates significance at the 10% level.
breakpoint Obs. F-statistic probability
2004M06 71 0.6313 0.9532
2004M12 77 0.7484 0.8454
2005M06 83 0.7465 0.8342
2005M12 89 0.7431 0.8196
2006M06 95 0.8323 0.6879
2006M12 101 0.9048 0.5743
2007M06 107 1.2270 0.2746
2007M12 113 1.8721 0.0918*
2008M01 114 2.2128 0.0579*
2008M02 115 2.2425 0.0688*
2008M03 116 0.5185 0.6704
2008M04 117 0.3382 0.7138
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Chapter Five: Employing Linear Prepayment Functions in 
MBS Valuation Model
In chapter four we have examined the parameters of the KYF model, including the 
PSA speed, the refinancing cost, the refinancing distribution and the Mortgagor Yield 
Curve. Our purpose was to investigate how the changes of these parameters affect the 
performance of the model and whether any variations of them can improve the 
accuracy of the model. However, the results show that the KYF model is not very 
sensitive to its own parameters. Variations of these parameters neither improve the 
accuracy of this model nor change its coupon bias.
Recall that in the KYF model Mortgage-backed securities are divided into different
buckets with different prepayment tendencies in order to reflect borrower
heterogeneity. The problem of the KYF model is that the same refinancing
distribution is assumed to all the mortgages despite their different coupon rates. For
example, the reference model in Chapter three assumes that refinancing starts when
the market rate is 100 basis points lower than the mortgage contract rate and the initial
refinancing rate is 50%. But in reality, mortgagors with different mortgage rates may
have different refinancing incentives towards the same market rate change. For
instance, for the same 100 basis points decline in the market rate, mortgagors with a
mortgage rate of 5% may have different perspectives from mortgagors with a
mortgage rate of 8%. It is possible that mortgagors with a 5% mortgage rate have low
incentives to refinance because the interest burden for them is not very high whereas
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the cost of refinancing is relatively high. On the other hand, mortgagors with an 8% 
mortgage rate are bearing higher interest burden; once there is a decline in the market 
rate they are more likely to refinance to reduce their interest payments. In fact, 
Boudoukh et al. (1997) have suggested that prepayment histories of GNMA MBSs 
differ substantially across the coupons and higher coupon GNMAs tend to prepay at 
faster rates
In this chapter we will experiment with employing linear functions to determine the 
prepayment rates of MBS pools, in which mortgage prepayment rate is defined as a 
function of the rate difference between the mortgage contract rate and the market 
interest rate. Previously in the KYF model, a series of refinancing rates are assigned 
to different groups of mortgage holders, depending on how far the market rate is away 
from the mortgage contract rate. This is to reflect that the magnitude of refinancing is 
dependent on market interest rate. It also models borrower heterogeneity. By 
replacing the static rates with a function that directly models the relation between 
mortgage prepayment rate and the market interest rate, we expect to capture the 
interest-rate-contingent refinancing activities and borrower heterogeneity in a 
dynamic and continuous manner. With the integration of mathematical methods such 
as linear functions, we also expect that the results revealed by the MBS valuation 
model are more straightforward to analyze. This will be particularly helpful as our 
main focus is to explore how the modelling of mortgage prepayment affects the MBS 
valuation model and how to improve mortgage prepayment modelling in order to
improve the MBS valuation model as a whole.
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The new MBS valuation model with the integration of a linear prepayment function 
will be tested with empirical data. Through the empirical investigation we wish to 
observe some insights regarding how the MBS valuation model reacts as the 
prepayment function varies. We are particularly interested to know whether the 
prepayments of mortgages with different coupon rates are better modelled by different 
prepayment functions. If this is the case, we may be able to observe clues on how to 
modify the MBS valuation model. Mathematical methods such as linear functions are 
also expected to offer more flexibility in terms of providing the solutions for 
modification.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the methodology of linear 
prepayment functions and the methodology of the MBS valuation model with the 
integration of linear prepayment functions. Section 5.2 investigates the new MBS 
valuation model using empirical data and discusses the results. Section 5.3 provides 
an out of the sample test of the model. Section 5.4 provides further robustness test of 
the model by implementing the model in a different interest rate environment. This 
section also compares its performance with the existing MBS valuation models. 
Section 5.5 summarizes and concludes this chapter.
5.1 Methodology Description
5.1.1 Methodology of Linear Prepayment Functions
The KYF model distinguishes mortgage prepayments as refinancing prepayments and 
turnover prepayments and model them separately. Refinancing prepayment represents
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the prepayment triggered by the decline of the interest rate; turnover prepayment 
represents the prepayment triggered by non-interest-rate factors such as house moving. 
However, by reviewing the empirical results of Chapter three we suspect that always 
having a certain level of turnover prepayment incorporated in the valuation model 
may have laid a barrier in reducing the pricing errors. The reasons are explained as 
follows.
In Chapter three we have investigated the performances of four models: the ordinary
annuity (OA) model which assumes no prepayment; the PSA model which assumes a
standard 75% PSA prepayment; the Optimal Option (0 0 ) model that assumes optimal
exercises of the in-the-money prepayment calls; and the KYF model which
incorporates both a 75% PSA turnover prepayment and the interest-rate-contingent
refinancing prepayment. The results in chapter three, as presented in Table 3.2, show
that when the MBS coupon rates are at low levels such as 4.5% or 5%, the OA model
has a much lower root mean squared error (RMSE) than the other three models. To be
more specific, when the coupon rate is 4.5%, the RMSE of the OA model in June
2008 test is only 1.18 while the RMSEs of the PSA model, the 0 0  model and the
KYF model are 2.44, 1.59, and 6.60 respectively. It is a similar case when the coupon
rate is 5%. This indicates that for low coupon mortgages the model assuming no
prepayment agrees the best with the market prices. In chapter four we have attempted
to employ different PSA speeds for the turnover prepayment of the KYF model to test
whether the errors for low coupon MBSs could be reduced. However, the RMSEs of
the KYF model remain at high levels, as shown in the RMSEs of models M l, M2 and
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M3 in Table 4.2. Thus, we believe that sometimes the turnover type prepayment can 
be so small that it is even neglectable; always having a certain level of turnover 
prepayment in the model may cause the problem of overstating mortgage 
prepayments and form a barrier to reducing the pricing errors.
In order to avoid this problem, in this chapter we propose not to distinguish the 
interest-rate-driven prepayment and the non-interest-rate-driven prepayment. Instead 
we try to incorporate all prepayments within one function. As is well known, 
refinancing prepayment contributes the most to mortgage prepayments. The factor 
affecting refinancing prepayment is the current level of mortgage rates relative to 
borrower’s contract rate. The more the contract rate exceeds the prevailing mortgage 
rate, the greater the incentive to refinance a mortgage loan. To model the positive 
relation between mortgage prepayment rate and the rate difference between mortgage 
contract rate and the prevailing market rate, we assume simple linear relation between 
them. We propose the prepayment function as follows:
P = a + bxR D  (5.1)
P is the prepayment rate. The prepayment rate is expressed as a percentage, 
representing the fraction or percentage of the remaining loan balance that will be 
prepaid. For example, a prepayment rate of 8% indicates that 8% of the pool’s 
remaining loan balance will be prepaid. RD is the rate difference between the 
mortgage contract rate and the market rate. The mortgage prepayment rate being the 
explained variable and the rate difference being the explanatory variable describes
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that interest-rate-dependent refinancing is the main source of mortgage prepayments. 
In the meantime, non-interest-rate-driven prepayments are expected to be captured by 
the constant term of the function and therefore require no special treatment.
By varying the parameters, the function is able to project different refinancing 
tendencies. For example, a function with low intercept and steep slope represents that 
few mortgagors choose to refinance right after the option becomes in-the-money but 
the prepayment rate will rise quickly if the market rate declines to lower levels; a 
function with high intercept and slow slope represents that a great percentage of 
mortgagors will prepay their mortgages immediately after the option becomes 
in-the-money but the prepayment rate climbs slowly afterwards as the market rate 
further declines.
When estimating the prepayment functions, we will use two points of data to 
determine the shape of the function: the initial prepayment rate when the prepayment 
option just becomes in-the-money (denoted as Pi) at the short end and the 
deep-in-the-money prepayment rate (denoted as Pi) at the long end. We will make 
assumptions on the values of these two points to form a number of different functions 
and then carry out the investigation on a trial and error basis.
We follow Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi (2004) to assume that the refinancing cost is 
100 basis points. This is to say that the initial refinancing starts when the market rate 
is 100 basis points lower than the mortgage rate, denoted as the rate difference 
parameter RDi = 1%. The prepayment rate at this point is the initial prepayment rate
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Pl. We also assume that when the market rate is 800 basis points lower than the 
mortgage rate, denoted as the rate difference parameter RD2 = 8%, the prepayment 
option becomes deep-in-the-money and the prepayment rate at this point is the 
deep-in-the-money prepayment rate P2 . We always set P2 to be higher than Pi because 
usually more refinancing will occur when the rate difference becomes larger. If we 
make assumptions on the values of the prepayment parameters Pi and P2 (as shown in 
the following diagram), we then equivalently determine the shape of the prepayment 
function line. The constant and slope of the line describe the refinancing tendency, 
such as how many of the mortgagors will actively refinance their mortgages 
immediately after the prepayment option becomes in the money, and how fast other 
mortgagors will progress to refinance once the rates are lower. We can always change 
the values of the initial prepayment rate Pi (for example to P p  as shown in the 
following diagram) and the deep-in-the-money prepayment rate P2 (for example to 
P2 ' as shown in the following diagram) to simulate different prepayment patterns.
0.8
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With the function being created, for a given level of the rate gap between the contract 
rate and the market rate the prepayment rate can be estimated. In our study, we have 
estimated 28 prepayment functions by evenly changing the assumptions of the 
prepayment parameters Pi and P2 so that we can test how different refinancing 
scenarios affect the MBS valuation model. With the rate difference parameter RDi at 
100 basis points and rate difference parameter RD2 at 800 basis points, we started 
with assuming a low initial prepayment rate Pi at 1% and the deep-in-the-money 
prepayment rate P2 at 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90% respectively to form the first 
five functions. Then we increase the initial prepayment rate Pi to the level of 10% and 
set the prepayment parameter P2 at 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% respectively, and four 
functions are estimated. Then the prepayment parameter P; is increased to 30% and 
the prepayment parameter P2 is set as 50%, 70% and 90% respectively, which 
generates three functions. Finally we increase the prepayment parameter Pi to 50% 
and set the prepayment parameter P2 as 70% and 90% to project two other 
prepayment behaviours. These functions are listed in Table 5.1 from FI to F14, a total 
of 14 functions.
We also want to test whether assuming the refinancing cost of 200 bps instead of 100 
bps, i.e. the rate difference parameter RDi at 200 bps instead of 100 bps, will make a 
difference in modelling mortgage prepayment. Therefore we repeat the above process 
of changing the prepayment parameters Pi and P2 , but assume the rate difference 
parameter RDi as 200 bps. These estimated functions are listed in Table 5.1 from F I5 
to F28, another 14 functions.
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Overall, Table 5.1 lists the 28 functions along with the corresponding assumptions of 
their initial prepayment rates and the deep-in-the-money prepayment rates. These 
functions are numbered from FI to F28, as displayed in the first column of Table 5.1. 
Columns two to five list the corresponding values of the rate difference RDi when the 
option becomes in-the-money, the initial prepayment rate P;, the rate difference RD2 
when the option becomes deep-in-the-money, and the deep-in-the-money prepayment 
rate P2 . The last column presents the prepayment function equations.
5.1.2 The Integration of a Linear Prepayment Function into MBS Valuation 
Model
The estimated linear prepayment functions will be used to project mortgage 
prepayment rates, evaluated against the interest rate lattice derived with an interest 
rate model. At each node of the tree, the prepayment rate will firstly be estimated and 
then the resulting cash flows. The value of the MBS is produced by averaging the 
discounted cash flows along the interest rate lattice.
The cash flow of a mortgage-backed security at each node derived from the 
prepayment function is shown in the following equations.
MBSCF, = SPP, + PREPMT, + MBSIP, (5.2)
r  /I 9 X n + r / I
Where SPP,=RLB,_,x - ^ & , x r / 1 2  (5.3)
PREPMT, = P ,x (RLB,_, -  SPP, ) (5.4)
P ,= a  + bxRDi (5.5)
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MBSIP, = RLB,_, XC/12 (5.6)
As expressed in Eq. (5.4), the cash flow of a mortgage-backed security at month t 
consists of the scheduled principal payment SPPt, the unscheduled principal 
prepayment PREPMPt and the interest payment to MBS investors MBSIPt. The 
scheduled principal payment SPPt is the scheduled total payment, as shown in the first 
part of Eq. (5.5), less the component of the mortgage interest payment shown in the 
second part of Eq. (5.5). RLBt.i is the remaining loan balance from previous period, rit 
is the term of the loan in years at month t, r is the weighted-average coupon of the 
underlying mortgage pool. The unscheduled principal prepayment PREPMTt is 
calculated as a fraction of the remaining loan balance of last period RLBt-i less the 
scheduled principal payment SPPt. The fraction P, here is the prepayment rate, which 
is estimated with linear function of Eq. (5.1). The interest payment passed through to 
MBS investors MBSIPt is calculated with the MBS coupon C of the mortgage-backed 
security.
The price of a mortgage-backed security is the present value of its discounted cash 
flows.
„ _ ^  MBSCF^
(l + r ,y  (5.7)
Pmbs is the price of the MBS; m is the maturity of the security and r, is the short-term 
rate generated from an interest rate model.
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In terms of modelling the interest rate lattice we will employ Black-Derman-Toy 
(stochastic volatility version) interest rate model and replicate the process of interest 
rate modelling in Chapter three. The interest rate process employed by the BDT 
model is as follows.
r{n j)  = xQxpiyP2i-n)yfd^) (5.8)
The term U( is the calibration factor that calibrates the interest rate process to an input 
zero coupon term structure of interest rates, is the local volatility which is calibrated 
to a volatility curve. The term dt is the time step, 0.083 in our study since we are 
estimating a monthly curve. This is consistent with the monthly cash flows of 
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
We will also follow the KYF model to estimate two interest rate lattices, one to 
project prepayment probabilities and the other one to discount MBS cash flows. For 
more details about modelling the term structure of interest rate, please refer to Section
3.3.3 in Chapter three.
5.2 Empirical Investigation of the Linear Prepayment Function 
Models
The 28 prepayment functions are integrated into the MBS valuation models
individually to form new MBS valuation models. June 2008 prices of GNMA 30-year
mortgage-backed securities are used for the empirical examination. This is in line
with the data set used in the investigations in Chapter four. The data has 95
observations, covering MBSs with a wide range of coupon rates from 4.5% to 8%.
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Prices of these new models are computed and the pricing errors against the market 
prices are calculated. Table 5.2 reports the root mean square errors (RMSEs) of these 
models, both the overall RMSEs and the RMSEs at each coupon level. The RMSEs of 
the original KYF model are also included at the end of the table to provide 
comparisons.
The first rows of each panel of Table 5.2 report the overall RMSEs of the 28 
prepayment function based MBS valuation models. The overall RMSEs range from 
3.4111 to 6.5079, which indicates that the overall performances of these functions do 
not vary that much. We then divide the MBSs into different groups based on their 
coupon rates and report the RMSEs at each coupon level. Looking at the table 
vertically, we find that the performance of each function fluctuates when the coupon 
rate changes from one level to another. Taking function FI as an example, the overall 
RMSE of function FI is 5.4727. When the coupon rate is 4.5%, the RMSE is as small 
as 0.9014. The RMSE increases as the coupon rate increases, and becomes as large as 
17.4437 when the coupon rate reaches 8%. The horizontal comparisons of the RMSEs 
of these functions also show the variation of the performances of these models. At the 
same coupon level, different functions perform quite differently. For example, at the 
coupon rate of 8% Function F4 has the largest RMSE of 23.6456 while the RMSE of 
Function F I3 is only 0.2550.
From Table 5.2 we could not observe one single function that has good performance 
across all coupon levels. However, within each coupon level, we can always identify a
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few good performers that have low RMSEs. By choosing the lowest RMSEs within 
each coupon category, we report the best four performers of each coupon level in 
Table 5.3, along with their prepayment function parameters Pi and P2 , function 
equations and the root mean squared errors at the corresponding coupon level. 
Interestingly we find that the best four performers for low coupons, such as 4.5%, 5% 
and 5.5%, happen to be the same, namely functions F4, F15, F16, and F17. Higher 
coupons such as 6%, 6.5%, 7%, and 8% also share the same best performers, 
including functions F12, F13, F14, F27 and F28. The statistical significance test of the 
RMSEs also show that these models are statistically significant than the original KYF 
model. This suggests that certain types of functions consistently perform well in a 
range of coupon levels.
The commonality among functions F4, F I5, F16, and F I7 is that they all have the
same initial prepayment rate P;, which is as low as 1%. This is to say that the prices
of low coupon MBSs tend to agree better with prepayment models that assume low
initial prepayment rate. This could be the result that low coupon mortgages are not
keen to refinance right after the prepayment option becomes in-the-money, because
the benefit of refinancing at this point does not seem rewarding enough. In contrast,
the deep-in-the-money prepayment rates P2 for these functions show little
commonality. The deep-in-the-money prepayment rates P2 for functions F4, F I5, F I6,
and F I7 are 70%, 10%, 30% and 50% respectively. As far as the rate difference
parameter RDi is concerned, F4 assumes the RDi at 100 bps and the other three
functions assume the RDi at 200 bps. This indicates that assuming a 100 bps or 200
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bps refinancing cost makes little difference to prepayment modelling and MBS 
valuation.
The best performers of higher coupon MBSs, functions F12, F13, F14, F27 and F28, 
on the other hand assume high initial prepayment rates Py, such as 30% or 50%. This 
suggests that functions assuming high initial prepayment rate better project the 
prepayment behaviours of high coupon mortgages. The reason of this could be that 
high coupon mortgagors are more willing to take advantage of the rate decline once 
the prepayment options become in-the-money. The deep-in-the-money prepayment 
rates P2 of these functions are also heterogeneous, being 90%, 70%, 90%, 70% and 90% 
respectively. Meanwhile, functions F12, F I3 and F14 assume the rate difference 
parameter RDi of 100 bps, and functions F27 and F28 assume the rate difference 
parameter RDi of 200 bps. This is consistent with our previous finding that assuming 
the refinancing cost being 100 bps or 200 bps makes little difference to the valuation 
model.
All in all, the investigation in this section shows that the performances of the 
prepayment function models fluctuate depending upon mortgage coupons. This 
confirms our original suspicion that mortgages with different coupon rate may have 
different prepayment tendencies even towards the same market rate change. The 
narrow differences of the overall root mean square errors of these models also suggest 
that it will be difficult to improve the MBS valuation model if this issue is not 
addressed. Our results also suggest that low coupon mortgages are better modelled by
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functions that assume low initial prepayment rates and prepayments for high coupon 
mortgages are better modelled by functions that assume high initial prepayment rates. 
Evidently, refinancing right after the prepayment option becomes in-the-money is less 
profitable for low coupon mortgages than for high coupon mortgages. Therefore, low 
coupon mortgagors tend to be slow-moving initially. In contrast, high coupon 
mortgagors are much more active. If this is the case, using the same prepayment 
function for all the mortgages regardless of their coupon rates seems inappropriate. If 
this proves to be correct, then we have an important extension to the KYF model. The 
KYF model improves the modelling of mortgage prepayment by suggesting the pool 
contains a heterogeneous population of homeowners with different refinancing 
tendencies. Now we are suggesting that the distribution of mortgagors with different 
refinancing tendencies may vary depending upon mortgage coupon rates. We suggest 
that applying different prepayment functions to mortgages with different coupon rates 
may potentially reduce the modelling error.
5.3 Out of the Sample Test of the Linear Prepayment Function 
Models
In this section we plan to perform an out of the sample test of these models. We will 
implement these models on the prices of the same group of MBSs but on a different 
date, 15th August 2008. The purpose of the out of sample test is to investigate 
whether our findings are consistent over time. Table 5.4 reports the root mean square 
errors of the out of the sample tests, also including both the overall RMSEs of each
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function and the RMSEs at each coupon level. The RMSEs of the original KYF 
model are reported at the end of the table as a benchmark reference. The statistical 
significance of the new models are tested against the original KYF model.
The results of the out of the sample test in August are consistent with the test in June. 
First of all, the out of sample test also illustrates that in general the overall 
performances of these functions do not vary that much, but each function’s 
performances at different coupon levels vary significantly. Taking function FI as an 
example, its RMSE for coupon of 4.5% is 2.8675, but stands at 20.2793 when the 
coupon rate is 8%. Taking the row of coupon of 7% as another example, function F12 
has the best performance with the smallest RMSE of 0.3455 while the worst 
performer function F I5 has the largest RMSE of 10.5648.
Secondly, we observe that the functions that perform well at each coupon level in 
June continue to have good performance in August. Panel A of Table 5.5 lists the best 
four functions at each coupon level in June and their RMSEs; Panel B of Table 5.5 
lists the best four functions at each coupon level in August and their RMSEs. The 
functions that are on both lists of June and August are highlighted. The best four 
performers of each coupon levels are also ranked from No. 1 to No. 4, with No. 1 
being the best performers and No. 4 being the fourth best performers.
As shown in Table 5.5, for coupons of 4.5% and 5%, functions F I5, F I6, and F I7 
continue to have good performances in both June and August tests. For coupons of 6% 
and above, functions F12, F13, F14, F27 and F28 continue to perform well. As we
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have mentioned before, functions F I5, F I6 and F I7 assume low initial prepayment 
rate; function F12, F13, F14, F27, and F28 assume high initial prepayment rate. These 
models are also statistical significant than the original KYF model at the 1% level.
The only exception is when the coupon rate is 5.5%, where the best four performers in 
August are different from the best ones in June. However, when we take a closer look 
at the results, we find that the coupon rate of 5.5% acts like an inflection point. To see 
this note that, in June the best four functions of coupon of 5.5% are the same as the 
best four functions of lower coupons including 4.5% and 5%, namely F16, F15, F17 
and F4. Meanwhile, in August the best four functions of coupon of 5.5% are the same 
as the best four functions of higher coupons such as 6% and above, namely F14, F13, 
F27 and F12. This means that in June the prepayment behaviour of coupon of 5.5% is 
in line with the prepayment behaviour of low coupon mortgages. However in August 
the prepayment behaviour of coupon 5.5% is in line with the prepayment behaviour of 
higher coupon mortgages. This makes sense if we take the interest rate environment 
changes into account. The 30-year libor rate, which is considered as the benchmark of 
30-year mortgage rate, was 5.231% in June 2008 but dropped to 4.938% in August. 
Although the interest rate drop is not enormous, it may be just enough to make the 
refinancing more attractive for mortgagors with 5.5% mortgages. In fact this reminds 
us that maybe we should always refer to the current market rate when judging whether 
a mortgage would follow low coupon prepayment behaviour or high coupon 
prepayment behaviour.
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5.4 The Robustness Test of the Linear Prepayment Function Models 
in Different Economic Environment
In this section we aim to test how the best performers in 2008 tests perform in a 
different interest rate environment. Testing the model in a different economic 
environment can provide important robustness check of how the model deals with 
different economic scenarios. We also intend to compare the linear prepayment 
function models with the OA, PSA, KYF and 0 0  models, to investigate whether the 
linear prepayment function models are able to reduce the pricing errors compared 
with the existing MBS valuation models.
The data used for the robustness test are the same group of GNMA 30-year 
mortgage-backed securities but on 15^  ^November 2010. The interest rate environment 
in 2010 has changed dramatically following the credit crunch in 2007 and 2008. 
Interest rates dropped sharply ever since. Table 5.6 displays the US dollar swap 
curves on 16i*^  June 2008, 15^  ^August 2008 and 15* November 2010, which clearly 
demonstrate the changes. The interest rates in June and August of 2008 are at similar 
level and in similar shape. But both the short-term rates and the long term rates 
dropped to substantially low levels in November 2010. The 3-month libor rate 
dropped from 2.813% in June 2008 to 0.253% in November 2010, a total of almost 
280 basis points. The 30-year libor rate dropped 130 basis points, from 5.231% to 
3.926%. The yield curve in November 2010 also became steeper compared with 2008. 
The spread between 30-year libor rate and 3-month libor rate in November 2010 was
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3.673% while the spreads in June and August of 2008 were 2.419% and 2.129% 
respectively.
Prepayment functions F4, F12, F13, F14, F15, F16, F27, and F28 are the functions 
that consistently perform well in both June 2008 and August 2008 tests. In this section 
we will focus on these functions and test whether they are able to produce good 
results in a completely different interest rate environment. We will also compare their 
performances with the OA model, the PSA model, the KYF model and the 0 0  model 
to examine whether the prepayment function models can reduce the pricing errors 
relative to these existing models. Table 5.7 reports the root mean square errors of the 
linear prepayment function models and the conventional models. The best performers 
at each coupon level are highlighted in the table.
The first row of Table 5.7 reports the overall RMSEs of each model. Among the OA, 
PSA, KYF and 0 0  model, the 0 0  model has the best performance with the smallest 
overall root mean square error of 4.6154. Following the 0 0  model, the KYF model 
has the second smallest root mean square error of 8.3877. The PSA and OA model 
perform relatively poorly with the root mean square errors of 11.1028 and 15.0108 
respectively. When we compare the linear prepayment function models with these 
four models, we find that all the nine linear prepayment function models are able to 
outperform the OA and PSA models, seven out of them outperform the KYF model 
and five out of them beat the 0 0  model. Function F4 with the root mean square error 
of 1.9412 stands out as the best performer in terms of overall performance.
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At each coupon level the best performers are also the prepayment function models 
with their RMSEs being much smaller than the conventional models. For example, 
when the coupon rate is 5%, function F27 is the best model with the RMSE of 0.6551, 
while the RMSEs of the KYF model and the 0 0  model are 5.6642 and 4.9633 
respectively. When coupon rate is 7%, function F4 has the smallest RMSE of 1.0820, 
while the RMSEs of the KYF model and the 0 0  model are 10.0804 and 8.4666. The 
results suggest that, compared with the existing models, linear prepayment function 
models are able to reduce the pricing errors, both in overall term and at 
coupon-specific levels. The statistical significance tests show that the squared pricing 
errors of linear prepayment function models are significantly smaller than the squared 
pricing errors of the KYF model for most of the time.
The robustness test of these prepayment function models also reveals new but even
more important information. At first sight the results of the robustness test seem to be
opposite to the results of Section 5.2 and 5.3 in two respects. First of all, according to
the June and August 2008 tests, low initial prepayment rate models apply better to
low coupon mortgages (from 4.5% to 5.5%). However, in the 2010 test high initial
prepayment rate models, such as functions F12, F13, F14, F27 and F28, are generally
performing better for low coupons of 4.5% to 5.5%. But if we consider that interest
rate has dropped to a much lower level in 2010, this appears to be reasonable since
what is a “high” and what is a “low” coupon has changed now. The current low
interest rate environment makes the coupon of 4.5% to 5.5% become “high” enough
to trigger considerable amount of refinancing. Therefore, this is consistent with our
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earlier findings that high coupon mortgages tend to follow the prepayment functions 
that assume high initial prepayment rate. This also emphasizes that whether a 
mortgage would follow low coupon mortgage prepayment behaviour or high coupon 
prepayment behaviour needs to be judged against the current economic environment.
Secondly, the June and August 2008 tests also suggest that high initial prepayment 
rate models apply better to high coupon mortgages. But in the 2010 test low initial 
prepayment rate functions, such as F4, perform better for high coupon mortgages 
(from 6% to 7%). In fact, this could be the result of refinancing burnout. Refinancing 
burnout refers to the phenomenon that prepayments tend to calm down when the 
mortgages are seasoned, especially when the prepayment options become 
deep-in-the-money for a long time. Table 5.9 reports the age statistics of the GNMA 
MBSs at each coupon level as of November 2010. The MBSs with coupon of 6%, 6.5% 
and 7% are obviously seasoned pools, as indicated by their average ages being 82, 78 
and 148 months respectively. The oldest pool within them even exceeds 20 years. In 
addition to the fact that these pools are seasoned mortgages, interest rate has kept 
dropping and remained at low levels in the last two years or so. Those who can 
benefit by taking advantage of the refinancing opportunity, such as active mortgagors 
with coupon rate of 6% or higher, have done so already before rates declined to the 
current level. This leaves slower reacting mortgagors in the pool only. These two 
factors together are likely to cause refinancing burnout. This is probably the reason 
why low initial prepayment rate functions better model the prepayment behaviours of
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high coupon mortgages.^ Richard and Roll (1989) also suggest that the more the 
prepayment option has been deep-in-the-money, the more burned out the pool is, and 
the smaller the prepayments are.
For the MBS with coupon of 8%, high initial prepayment rate functions such as F12, 
F13, F14, F27 and F28 have better performances than the low initial prepayment rate 
functions. This is probably because that this pool is not seasoned enough to have 
refinancing burnout effect since its age is only 55 months. Therefore high initial 
prepayment rate models still apply.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
While older generation of prepayment modelling relies on either the PSA method, 
which assumes constant prepayment rates depending on the age of the mortgage, or 
the Optimal Option model, which assumes the prepayment option will be exercised 
optimally, the KYF model suggests that mortgage pools contain heterogeneous 
population of homeowners with different refinancing tendencies. They model the 
heterogeneity by breaking the mortgage pool into several buckets and assigning each 
bucket with a different refinancing behaviour. In this chapter we extend the KYF 
model by employing linear prepayment functions to model the heterogeneity of 
mortgage prepayment behaviours.
9 At first glance, the 4.5% coupon pool appears to be an exception as it has an elderly age profile yet a high initial prepayment 
function FI3 performs best. However an average coupon o f 4.5% is historically extremely low so it could be that these 
mortgagors only now can profitably refinance.
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We estimated 28 prepayment functions, which represent 28 different refinancing 
tendencies, and implemented them into the valuation of GNMA MBSs in order to 
investigate how the MBS valuation model reacts to different refinancing tendencies. 
We also examined how the new MBS valuation models perform in a different interest 
rate environment and how they perform compared with the existing models such as 
the KYF model and the 0 0  model.
Our investigation reveals that the overall performances of these prepayment function 
models do not vary that much, but the performance of each model at different coupon 
levels fluctuates. Each of them tends to apply better to certain coupon levels but 
perform poorly to the others. This confirms our suspicion that mortgages with 
different coupon rates have different refinancing tendencies. If this is the case, 
assuming the same refinancing pattern to all classes of mortgages may lead to errors 
in pricing mortgages and MBSs. The narrow differences of the overall performances 
of these models also suggest that it can be difficult to improve the MBS valuation 
model if this issue is not addressed.
More importantly, the best performers at each coupon level in the initial test 
consistently have good performances in the out of the sample test. The functions that 
apply better to low coupon mortgages are those that assume low initial prepayment 
rates and the ones for high coupon mortgages assuming high initial prepayment rates. 
But our results suggest that a “high” or “low” coupon needs to be judged against the 
prevailing economic environment. Our investigation also shows that the prepayment
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function models are able to cope with different interest rate environment. They are 
also proved to be able to outperform the KYF model and the 0 0  model.
By jointly reviewing the three tests, we make the following suggestions. Generally 
speaking, when the mortgage coupon rate is below the prevailing funding or 
refinancing rate (as proxied by the 30 year libor rate) plus the refinancing cost, a 
prepayment function with a low initial prepayment rate and a high slope will model 
the prepayments best; when the mortgage pool has a coupon above the current 
refinancing rate plus the refinancing cost, a prepayment function with a high initial 
prepayment and a mild slope will perform best. The low initial prepayment high slope 
function for "low" coupon mortgages reflects the fact that when the prepayment 
option just becomes in-the-money, only a small fraction of low coupon mortgagors 
will choose to refinance. But the percentage is likely to rise quickly if the market rate 
continues to drop. On the other hand, the high initial prepayment mild slope 
function for "high" coupon mortgages indicates that a large percentage of high 
coupon mortgagors will choose to refinance immediately after the option becomes 
in-the-money due to high profitability. The percentage will rise moderately afterwards 
when the market rate drops to further lower level.
However, when the underlying mortgages are seasoned mortgages, especially when 
the prepayment option has been deep-in-the-money for a long time, mortgages are 
likely to have refinancing burnout, where active home owners have already refinanced 
their mortgages to take advantage of the rates decline. The remainders in the pool are
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either reluctant or unable to refinance due to personal reasons. In this case, the low 
initial prepayment high slope function will model their prepayments the best.
Our investigations clearly suggest that mortgages with different coupon rates are 
associated with different prepayment behaviours. Our results are also able to 
demonstrate how they are associated. But the underlying economic rationale behind 
the association is unknown. We suspect that mortgages with certain coupons are 
issued at certain period of time due to the high correlations between mortgage rates 
and market interest rates, and the economic factors at the time of issuance may have 
potential influence on mortgage prepayments. However, the investigation of this 
question requires loan-level data. We were unable to perform the investigation due to 
lack of this set of data. But it certainly is an interesting area for future research if the 
loan-level data is provided.
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Table 5.1 Prepayment Function List
This table lists the estimated 28 linear prepayment functions along with the corresponding assumptions o f their initial 
prepayment rates and the deep-in-the-money prepayment rates. RDi is the initial rate difference when the prepayment option just 
becomes in-the-money and Pi is the initial prepayment rate at this point. RD2 is the rate difference when the prepayment option is 
deep-in-the-money and Ft is the deep-in-the-money prepayment rate at this point. The last column o f  this table presents the 
corresponding functions.
RDi Pi RD2 P2 Function
FI 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.1 P=-0.003+1.286*(r-k)
F2 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.3 P=-0.0314+4.14*(r-k)
F3 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.5 P= -0.06+7*(r-k)
F4 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.7 P=-0.0886+9.86*(r-k)
F5 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.9 P=-0.1171+12.71*(r-k)
F6 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.3 P= 0.0714+2.86*(r-k)
F7 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.5 P= 0.0429+5.71 *(r-k)
F8 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.7 P=0.0143+8.57*(r-k)
F9 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.9 P=-0.0143+11.43*(r-k)
FIO 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.5 P=0.2714+2.86*(r-k)
F ll 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.7 P= 0.2429+5.71*(r-k)
F12 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.9 P= 0.2143+8.57*(r-k)
F13 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4714+2.86*(r-k)
F14 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.4429+5.71 *(r-k)
F15 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.1 P= -0.02+1.5*(r-k)
F16 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.3 P= -0.0867+4.83 *(r-k)
F17 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.5 P= -0.1533+8.17*(r-k)
F18 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.7 P= -0.22+11.50*(r-k)
F19 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.9 P=-0.2867+14.83*(r-k)
F20 0.02 0.1 0.08 0.3 P=0.0333+3.33*(r-k)
F21 0.02 0.1 0.08 0.5 P= -0.0333+6.67*(r-k)
F22 0.02 0.1 0.08 0.7 P= -0.10+10*(r-k)
F23 0.02 0.1 0.08 0.9 P=-0.1667+13.33*(r-k)
F24 0.02 0.3 0.08 0.5 P= 0.2333+3.33*(r-k)
F25 0.02 0.3 0.08 0.7 P= 0.1667+6.67*(r-k)
F26 0.02 0.3 0.08 0.9 P=0.10+10*(r-k)
F27 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4333+3.33*(r-k)
F28 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.3667+6.67*(r-k)
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Table 5.3 The Best Four Functions o f Each Coupon Level and Their RMSEs (June 2008)
This table summarizes the best four functions at each coupon level in the June 2008 test. For lower coupons such as 4.5%, 5% 
and 5.5%, functions F4, F15, F16 and F17 continue to have good performance. This group o f  functions all assume low initial 
prepayment rate and high slope. For higher coupon mortgages such as 6% and above, functions F12, F13, F14, F27 and F28 tend 
to perform well. These functions assume higher initial prepayment rate but mild slope.
DRi Pi DR2 P2 Function RMSEs
0.045 F4 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.7 P= -0.0886+9.86*{r-k) 0.2125
F15 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.1 P= -0.02+1.5*{r-k) 0.3104
F16 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.3 P= -0.0867+4.83*(r-k) 0.4210
F17 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.5 P= -0.1533+8.17*(r-k) 0.5599
0.05 F4 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.7 P= -0.0886+9.86*{r-k) 0.5479
F15 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.1 P= -0.02+1.5*(r-k) 0.7449
F16 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.3 P= -0.0867+4.83*(r-k) 0.9290
F17 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.5 P= -0.1533+8.17*(r-k) 1.1272
0.055 F4 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.7 P= -0.0886+9.86*(r-k) 3.0194
F15 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.1 P= -G.02+1.5*(r-k) 3.0055
F16 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.3 P= -0.0867+4.83*(r-k) 2.9828
F17 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.5 P= -0.1533+8.17*(r-k) 3.0134
0.06 F12 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.9 P= 0.2143+8.57*(r-k) 2.7116
F13 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4714+2.86*{r-k) 2.3343
F14 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.4429+5.71*(r-k) 2.2117
F27 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4333+3.33*(r-k) 2.7053
0.065 F12 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.9 P= 0.2143+8.57*(r-k) 1.7557
F13 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4714+2.86*{r-k) 1.2608
F14 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.4429+5.71*{r-k) 0.9865
F28 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.3667+6.67*(r-k) 1.8029
0.07 F12 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.9 P= 0.2143+8.57*(r-k) 0.2350
F13 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4714+2.86*{r-k) 0.4099
F27 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4333+3.33*{r-k) 0.3918
F28 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.3667+6.67*{r-k) 0.2649
0.08 F12 0.01 0.3 0.08 0.9 P= 0.2143+8.57*{r-k) 0.5308
F13 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.7 P= 0.4714+2.86*(r-k) 0.2550
F14 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.4429+5.71*{r-k) 0.6326
F28 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.9 P= 0.3667+6.67*(r-k) 0.6577
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Chapter 6: General Conclusions and Directions for Future 
Work
This study was set out to explore the prepayment risk caused uncertainties in the 
valuation of mortgage-backed securities and seek solutions for improving the 
option-theoretic MBS valuation models. Option-theoretic valuation models are widely 
used in valuation of other fixed-income securities. But their applications for the 
valuation of mortgage-backed securities face challenges due to the suboptimal 
exercise of the prepayment options. Mortgagors often exercise their prepayment 
options suboptimally. Some mortgagors may delay the exercise of the in-the-money 
options because they expect further declines in the market rates. On the other hand, 
other mortgagors may have to terminate their mortgages even when the mortgage 
rates are favourable simply because of job relocation. These irrational option exercise 
activities bring difficulties to valuing mortgage-backed securities with conventional 
models. Researchers in this area have devoted much of their effort to explore the 
solutions of how to incorporate suboptimal exercise activities into their 
option-theoretic valuation models. However, no closed-form solutions was established 
yet. The financial crisis in 2007-2008 also brought mortgage-backed securities under 
the spotlight because many MBS investors admitted that they made losses because 
they did not quite understand how to model mortgage prepayment risk and value 
mortgage-backed securities. This thesis was committed to explore this area and make 
effort to add contributions. Particularly, this study sought to answer the following 
questions: First, how does the modelling of mortgage prepayment affect MBS 
valuation model? Second, are there any factors that are important in modelling 
mortgage prepayment but have been missing from previous researches? Third, if there
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are any, how to incorporate them into the modelling of mortgage prepayment so as to 
improve the option-theoretic MBS valuation model.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 reviews the research work of this 
thesis and presents the empirical findings. Section 6.2 explains the theoretical and 
managerial implications of the main findings. Section 6.3 discusses the limitations of 
this study and also points out possible directions or areas for future research.
6.1 Empirical Findings of This Thesis
This thesis contains three main studies. The first study empirically examines an 
option-theoretic MBS valuation model proposed by Kalotay, Yang and Fabozzi 
(2004). The KYF model proposes a sophisticated structure to treat borrower 
heterogeneity and suboptimal exercises of the prepayment options, but no rigorous 
empirical examination was included. Along with the KYF model, three other models 
with different prepayment models were also tested to provide comparisons, including 
the model assuming no prepayment, the model assuming a standard 75% PSA 
prepayment, and the model assuming optimal exercises of the prepayment options to 
provide comparisons. The results reveal two pieces important information. Firstly, 
overall the KYF model can easily outperform the model assuming no mortgage 
prepayment and the model assuming standard PSA prepayments, although no priority 
of the KYF model over the optimal option model was found. This indicates that 
mortgage prepayment is playing an important role in valuation of MBSs; ignoring 
mortgage prepayment or modelling prepayment with simple PSA method lead to 
serious errors in the valuation of MBS. On the other hand, the option-theoretic models, 
including both the KYF model and the optimal option model, are able to make evident 
improvement. Secondly, the performance of the KYF model is very sensitive to
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mortgage coupons. It has high positive errors for low coupon MBSs such as 4.5% or 
5%. The pricing error drops as coupon rate increases and reaches its lowest level at 
the coupon of 6% or 6.5%. It falls to negative values afterwards. When the coupon 
rate is 7.5% or 8%, the KYF model has large negative pricing errors. The standard 
deviations of the KYF pricing errors at each coupon levels are relatively low, which 
confirms that the coupon bias of the KYF model is rather systematic.
The second study then examines the parameters of the KYF model in order to 
investigate how these parameters affect the performance of this model and whether 
any of them are responsible for the coupon effect of the model. However, the results 
show that the performance of the KYF model does not change very much when its 
own parameters alter to other values. The variations of the KYF parameters neither 
improve the accuracy of the model nor change its coupon sensitivity profile.
The third study extends the KYF model by employing linear prepayment functions to 
model borrower heterogeneity. The prepayment fimction proposed in this study 
directly models the relation between mortgage prepayment rate and the market 
interest rate, replacing the static refinancing distributions previously assumed by the 
KYF model. New MBS valuation models with the integration of the prepayment 
functions were also tested with empirical data. The results are able to reveal important 
information regarding how to improve the modelling of mortgage prepayment and 
subsequently the MBS valuation model.
First of all, the investigation demonstrates that mortgages with different coupon rates 
have different refinancing tendencies even towards the same market interest rate 
change. Mortgages within the same coupon level seem to share similar prepayment
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patterns. If this is the case, different refinancing patterns should be employed to 
mortgages with different coupons.
Furthermore, the results also reveal specific insights on how mortgage prepayment 
behaviours are associated with mortgage coupon rates. Our results suggest that when 
the mortgage coupon rate is below the prevailing funding or refinancing rate (as 
proxied by the 30 year libor rate) plus the refinancing cost, a prepayment function 
with a low initial prepayment rate and a high slope will model the prepayments best; 
when the mortgage pool has a coupon above the current refinancing rate plus the 
refinancing cost, a prepayment function with a high initial prepayment and a mild 
slope will perform best. The low initial prepayment high slope function for "low" 
coupon mortgages reflects the fact that when the prepayment option just becomes 
in-the-money, only a small fraction of low coupon mortgagors will choose to 
refinance. But the percentage is likely to rise quickly if the market rate continues to 
drop. On the other hand, the high initial prepayment mild slope function for "high" 
coupon mortgages indicates that a large percentage of high coupon mortgagors will 
choose to refinance immediately after the option becomes in-the-money due to high 
profitability. The percentage will rise moderately afterwards when the market rate 
drops to further lower level.
Thirdly, the effect of refinancing burnout on the modelling of mortgage prepayment 
was also demonstrated. Our results suggest that when the underlying mortgages 
are seasoned mortgages, especially when the prepayment option has been 
deep-in-the-money for a long time, the low initial prepayment high slope function will 
model their prepayments the best.
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6.2 Theoretical and Managerial Implications of This Study
This study for the first time points out that mortgages within the same coupon level 
share similar prepayment patterns and different refinancing tendencies should 
therefore be employed to mortgages with different coupon rates when modelling 
mortgage prepayment and valuing MBSs. Boudoukh et al. (1997) find similar 
cross-sectional difference among GNMAs with different coupons during their 
investigation of the relation between MBS prices and the fundamental economic 
determinants. But their study does not directly study the MBS valuation model. Kau, 
Keenan and Li (2011) also suggest that mortgagors within the same subgroup may 
share a common unobserved factor, which can affect their mortgage termination 
activities. Our results suggest that mortgage coupon rate is one of the common factors 
that have impact on mortgage terminations. Our results also demonstrate that when 
the association between refinancing and mortgage coupon rates was not included into 
the MBS valuation, it appeared to be difficult to reduce the pricing errors; once this 
association was included in the modelling, pricing errors were greatly reduced. Our 
investigations also provide specific insights of how refinancing activities are 
associated with different mortgage coupons.
These findings will be particularly useful to financial institutions that have mortgages 
or MBSs in their portfolios, such as mortgage originators, MBS issuers and MBS 
investors. These mortgage or MBS holders are keen to monitor the prepayment risk of 
their mortgage portfolios to ensure that the duration of their portfolios and the 
financing are well matched. A better understanding of prepayment behaviour can be 
profitable knowledge for these mortgage and MBS portfolio holders.
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6.3 Limitations of This Study
Findings and contributions aside, the methodology has several limitations and much 
work needs to be done in the future to make it a better model. One of the limitations is 
that we assume a linear relation between mortgage prepayment rate and the rate 
difference between the mortgage contract rate and the market rate. Simple linear 
function is a good start for investigating how the modelling of mortgage prepayments 
affects the valuation model of mortgage-backed securities. No doubt the results have 
indeed provided informative information in this regard. But it is possible that the 
relation between the mortgage prepayment rate and the rate difference between the 
mortgage contract rate and the market rate is non-linear or perhaps another form of a 
linear function. Experimenting with other forms of functions or extending the simple 
linear prepayment function in the future may provide broader information with respect 
to how to improve the valuation model of MBSs.
Another limitation is that our investigation on linear prepayment functions is carried 
out on a trial and error basis. The trial and error method has been useful for 
discovering the general rules of the applications of the prepayment functions. Through 
the trial and error basis we were able to find out that mortgages with different 
mortgage rates have different reactions when interest rate drops. The results also made 
clear indications on how mortgages with different coupon rates react to market rate 
change. But if an optimization method can be incorporated into the valuation model to 
identify the function that best describes the MBS price, we may be able to reduce the 
pricing errors to a minimum level more efficiently. However, integrating optimization 
programming into the MBS valuation model requires extensive programming skills.
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During this study we were unable to find programming experts to help us in this 
regard. But this is certainly an interesting area to explore in the future.
6.4 Recommendations for Future Work
Our first recommendation for future research is to extend the simple linear 
prepayment function to a more robust function to describe the relation between 
mortgage prepayment and the spread of mortgage contract rate and market interest 
rate. As stated earlier, the relation between mortgage prepayment and the rate spread 
may be nonlinear or other forms of linear relations. Therefore, it would be useful to 
experiment with other forms of functions, such as nonlinear or other forms of linear. 
Experimenting with other forms of functions may not only help us find the function 
that better describes the relation between mortgage prepayment and the rate difference 
between mortgage rate and market rate. It may also provide broader and deeper 
information with respect to how to improve the valuation model of MBSs.
In the future we also seek to work collaboratively with programming experts to 
incorporate the optimization method into the MBS valuation model. We hope through 
the incorporation of the optimization method we may be able to reduce the pricing 
errors to a minimum level more efficiently, and therefore improve the overall 
accuracy of the MBS valuation model. This is obviously helpful to MBS investors to 
make their MBS investment decisions.
Another possible future research area is to study the economic rationale behind the 
association between refinancing patterns and mortgage coupon rates. Is the 
association related to other economic factors at the origination of the mortgage? It is 
possible that mortgages with certain coupons are issued at certain period of time due 
to the high correlations between mortgage rates and market interest rates, and the
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economic factors at the time of issuance may have potential influence on mortgage 
prepayments. If the underlying economic rationale can be unveiled, we may be able to 
incorporate the economic factors to improve the modelling of mortgage prepayment 
and valuation of mortgage-backed securities. However, the investigation of the 
underlying economic rationale requires loan-level data. We were unable to pursue this 
investigation due to lack of data. But it certainly is an interesting area for future 
research given the loan-level data is provided.
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